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ABSTRACT 
 
A Process Model of Applicant Faking on Overt Integrity Tests. 
 (December 2008) 
Janie Yu, B.A., University of California, Los Angeles; 
M.A., California State University, Long Beach 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Daniel A. Newman 
 
 To better understand the cognitive processes associated with faking behaviors, 
Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior was adapted to the study of faking on overt 
integrity tests. This decision-based model is then expanded through the inclusion of a 
key outcome (counterproductive work behavior) and basic individual differences 
(conscientious personality and cognitive ability). Results from two student samples (n = 
233 and n = 160) demonstrate that conscientiousness negatively predicts attitudes toward 
faking on employment tests, while cognitive ability predicts the ability to fake. In turn, 
faking ability moderates the effect of self-reported faking motive on actual test scores, 
while self-reported faking decreases the validity of integrity tests for predicting 
counterproductive work behaviors. Implications are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Though expanding, our understanding of applicant faking in the context of the 
selection process remains incomplete. While most researchers agree that job applicants 
can and do elevate their scores on non-cognitive tests by faking (e.g., Arthur, Woehr, & 
Graziano, 2000; Berry, Sackett, & Wiemann, 2007; Hough & Oswald, 2007; Ones, 
Viswesvaran, & Reiss, 1996), the antecedent processes and subsequent consequences of 
faking are still unclear. Part of our lack of understanding may be attributable to the lack 
of empirically tested models or appropriate theoretical structures to explain the process 
(Griffith & McDaniel, 2006; Murphy, 2000). Moreover, there seems to be a limited 
understanding of possible outcomes associated with applicant faking, such as 
counterproductive work behaviors (CWB). With mixed evidence on the extent and 
impact of faking, researchers appear to be divided on how much faking matters in 
practice, and additional research is needed (e.g., Griffith, Chmielowski, & Yoshita, 
2007; Hogan, Barrett, & Hogan, 2007; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Morgeson et al., 
2007). 
According to recent studies, approximately 30-50% of job applicants consciously 
try to elevate their scores (Donovan, Dwight, & Hurtz, 2003; Griffith et al., 2007)1. 
Faking on the part of job applicants represents part of a strategic approach to compete 
for employment through the use of deliberate attempts to manipulate information and 
create false beliefs and impressions in others (Masip, Garrido, & Herrero, 2004, as cited 
 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Journal of Applied Psychology. 
1
 For example, Donovan et al. (2003) surveyed applicants using a randomized response technique (to 
ensure anonymity), and found that applicants admitted to extensive faking efforts: 56% of respondents 
admitted to exaggerating positive characteristics, and 17% admitted to outright fabrication. 
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in Griffith & McDaniel, 2006). Unfortunately, applicant faking has proven difficult to 
detect and study since, by its very nature, the behavior is hidden. While substantial 
research has been devoted to detecting and mitigating applicant faking, no techniques 
appear to solve the problem adequately (Berry et al., 2007; Morgeson et al., 2007). In 
addition, while several studies have attempted to identify processes and characteristics 
relevant to faking on measures such as personality tests, much less is known about 
faking on other kinds of non-cognitive measures such as integrity tests, which differ 
substantially in both content and application. 
Research on faking has focused on two general themes: (1) whether applicants 
can and do fake (e.g., Cunningham, Wong, & Barbee, 1994; Rosse, Stecher, Miller, & 
Levin, 1998; Ryan & Sackett, 1987), and (2) the degree to which faking affects the 
validity of these pre-employment tests (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1996; Cunningham et al., 
1994; Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Ones et al., 1996; Ones & 
Viswesvaran, 1998a; Rosse et al., 1998; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006; Zickar & Drawsgow, 
1996; Zickar, 2000). If the extent of faking were relatively constant across individuals, 
then faking would not generally harm the quality of personnel decisions based on test 
scores; such decisions are generally based on rank-order (Douglas, McDaniel, & Snell, 
1996), not mean-level information. However, research has demonstrated the existence of 
individual differences in the extent to which applicants fake (Mueller-Hanson, 
Heggestad, & Thornton, 2006; Morgeson et al., 2007), though our understanding of 
these influences is limited. 
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 The goal of the current paper is to sketch a theoretical structure for the faking 
process to explain why and when applicants will intentionally distort their responses 
(i.e., fake) on integrity tests, a commonly used non-cognitive selection tool. The theory 
of planned behavior framework (Ajzen, 1985; 1991; and Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Beck 
& Ajzen, 1991) will be used to build a decision-based model of the faking process. This 
model will (1) describe the basic decisional processes that relate to faking behavior, (2) 
differentiate between two primary aspects of faking behavior, (3) assess some of the 
ways in which individual differences in personality and ability are related to individual 
differences in faking-related attitudes, behaviors, and outcomes, and (4) examine the 
effect of faking on individual integrity test scores, and the estimated validity of those 
scores for predicting workplace deviance, a key organizational outcome. 
Integrity in the workplace 
Research on integrity subsumes a wide variety of behaviors such as illegal drug 
use, fraud, petty theft, and unwarranted absenteeism (Berry et al., 2007; Murphy, 2000; 
Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 2003). Tests designed to measure integrity are 
especially popular in industrial sectors such as retail and finance, where they are used to 
help select applicants for positions that have unsupervised access to money or 
merchandise (Berry et al., 2007; Sackett, Burris, & Callahan, 1989), or other positions in 
which employee theft or dishonesty produce high costs to organizations (Murphy, 1993; 
Ryan & Sackett, 1987; Sackett & Harris, 1984). These tests are often used as part of a 
larger selection process to screen out individuals whose dishonesty or CWBs could lead 
to significant long-term costs if they were to be hired. 
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 Reviews of integrity tests have generally found them to be valid selection tools, 
capable of predicting a number of important organizational outcomes. Integrity tests 
demonstrate predictive and concurrent validities for criteria such as job performance, 
workplace violence, absenteeism, turnover, substance abuse, theft, and other CWBs  
(Berry et al., 2007; Murphy, 2000; Ones et al.,1993, 2003; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998a). 
For example, research has found that integrity test scores show significant predictive 
validities, such as mean correlations of .21 (.34 correcting for statistical artifacts) with 
job performance and .33 with measures of counterproductivity (.47 correcting for 
statistical artifacts; Ones et al., 1993; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Wanek, Sackett, & Ones, 
2003). The widespread use of integrity tests is likely to continue due to a lack of viable 
alternative measures (for example, federal legislation drastically limits the use of 
polygraph testing, one of the more prominent alternatives to paper-and-pencil integrity 
tests) and a relative lack of adverse impact against protected groups (O’Bannon, 
Goldinger, & Appleby, 1989; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1995; Sackett & Wanek, 
1996). Specifically, subgroup differences are negligible and there is no correlation of 
race, sex, or age with integrity scores (Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998b). 
 Despite broad agreement on the criterion-related validity of integrity tests, there 
are several potential issues with their use. One major issue is exactly what kind of test is 
being used; this is a critical issue, as there are multiple types of integrity tests which 
involve different types of items and ways of measuring integrity. Research suggests 
these tests might assess slightly different constructs. Tests designed to measure integrity 
consist of two major types designed to assess individual integrity in different ways, 
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using different items: (1) covert (or “veiled purpose”) tests and (2) overt (or “clear 
purpose”) tests. 
 Covert tests are personality-based tests designed to indirectly infer integrity from 
responses to questions that are not obviously related to integrity. Most covert integrity 
tests share a number of features, and are composed of items designed to measure one or 
more of the following areas: (1) general personality traits and beliefs related to integrity, 
and (2) reactions to hypothetical situations. Some personality–based tests of integrity are 
related to constructs such as thrill-seeking, socialization, and resistance to authority 
(Sackett et al, 1989). More recent tests have incorporated broad dimensions of 
personality that have been empirically linked to theft and CWBs, notably 
conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability (Berry et al., 2007). 
 Overt integrity tests also share several features. For example, they are generally 
composed of items that measure the following domains: (1) direct admissions of illegal 
or questionable activities and (2) attitudes or opinions regarding illegal or questionable 
behavior. Overt tests usually include direct and indirect measures of perceptions of 
norms relating to honesty. The rationale for this type of measure is that some individuals 
believe dishonesty, theft, and similar behaviors are common or widely accepted, and 
these individuals are more likely to engage in such behaviors themselves. Even questions 
asking for direct admissions of wrongdoing are probably best understood as measures of 
perceived norms. For example, individuals who are willing to admit on integrity tests to 
theft, dishonesty, and rule-breaking might well be individuals who believe that such 
behaviors are commonplace, or at least likely to be tacitly accepted by others. 
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 Research into the construct validity of integrity tests has produced different 
views on what these two major types of tests measure. Some researchers have suggested 
that both types of integrity tests tap into the same underlying construct(s). Other 
researchers have argued that personality-based tests and overt integrity tests may 
represent slightly different constructs, and tap into different individual traits and 
experiences. 
 Early research by Ones (1994) involved a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on 
three overt tests and four personality-based tests. She found that the relationships 
between the variables were best described by a hierarchical model in which separate 
overt and covert factors had strong loadings on a single overall integrity factor, which 
was labeled “conscientiousness.” In a similar study, Hogan and Brinkmeyer (1997) 
found that scores on two different overt and covert tests loaded on different first-order 
factors, which loaded on a single higher-order factor again labeled “conscientiousness.” 
Wanek et al. (2003) found that overt and covert tests had similar overall relationships 
with four separate principal components of integrity (antisocial behavior, socialization, 
positive outlook, and diligence). 
 However, other research has found evidence that personality-based tests and 
overt tests may tap into different constructs. Wooley and Hakstian (1992) found that 
scores on an overt test correlated very poorly with scores on three different personality-
based measures (largest r = .39, other rs smaller or not significant). Ones (1994) found 
that overt tests appeared to be less cohesive in focus (represented by smaller 
intercorrelations among different measures of the same construct) than personality-based 
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tests (r = .45, corrected for statistical artifacts, compared to .70). The meta-analysis also 
found that overt and covert tests tended to have relatively low correlations with one 
another (r = .39, corrected for statistical artifacts), suggesting that scores on different 
types of tests may vary considerably (see Ones, 1994). In addition, there is evidence that 
the two types of tests may differ in their relationships to personality constructs. Ones 
(1994) also showed that conscientiousness, agreeableness, and emotional stability 
correlated .45, .44, and .37 with scores on personality-based tests, and .39, .34, and .28 
with overt test scores (all correlations corrected for unreliability and range restriction). 
 While these correlations are of roughly similar magnitude, evidence for 
consistently different patterns of relationships with one another and other variables led 
several major reviews of the integrity testing literature to conclude that overt and covert 
tests tap into broadly similar constructs in dissimilar ways (Cullen & Sackett, 2004) and 
that research on the two types of tests cannot be treated as interchangeable (Berry et al., 
2007). Research has also found that test-takers react differently to the two types of tests 
– for example, perceiving that overt tests are more procedurally fair (Whitney, Diaz, 
Mineghino, & Powers, 1999). Finally, the literature suggests that overt tests, given their 
clear-purpose nature, may be more susceptible to applicant faking than covert tests (e.g., 
Murphy, 2000; Sacket & Harris, 1984). To date, a significant portion of research into 
faking and non-cognitive selection tests has focused on personality tests. However, more 
research on the faking of overt integrity test is needed. Faking on integrity tests is 
psychologically different from faking on personality tests because of factors such as the 
strong moral undertones associated with failing or passing integrity tests. In this sense, 
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the need to manage one’s response should be more salient for those taking an integrity 
tests because of the clear implications of not passing the test (i.e., the possibility of being 
labeled dishonest). 
Faking and selection tests 
 Past research has identified a number of different types of response distortion 
that have the potential to negatively affect selection processes. One of the major 
distinctions, first made by Meehl and Hathaway (1946), was between the concepts of 
unconscious self-deception (social desirability) and consciously motivated faking 
(impression management). Self-deception refers to positively biased responses that 
respondents believe to be true (Paulhus, 1984). Guion (1965) suggested that self-
deceptive responses occur when test-takers lack self-insight or unintentionally use the 
test to present an idealized self-concept. By contrast, faking (i.e., impression 
management) involves a deliberate and insincere attempt to create a favorable 
impression in others (Paulhus, 1984). 
 Both of these facets of response distortion represent important barriers to 
accurate measurement in a selection context, leading to bias that affects estimates of 
applicants’ true standing on some construct of interest. Response distortion is seen as a 
particularly important problem in the domain of non-cognitive selection tests, such as 
personality tests. Since these tests have no clear right or wrong answer, individuals have 
much more latitude in the way that they use their responses to present an image (whether 
consciously or unconsciously). Social desirability represents a dispositional source of 
honest error (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Tett et al., 2006); such distortions are not 
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expected to vary much across different situations (Paulhus, 1984). However, faking 
represents deliberately dishonest error; this sort of deceptive behavior is especially 
troubling for employers (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006), who are justifiably worried about 
the potential for hiring someone who is willing to tell them deliberate falsehoods for 
personal gain. 
 To detect and measure applicant faking, researchers have used several different 
measures. One of the most common approaches is the use of scales to detect faking and 
other types of response distortion (Hough et al., 1990; Rosse et al., 1998), sometimes 
referred to as lie scales or social desirability scales (Paulhus, 1991). Lie scales designed 
to detect faking (e.g., active impression management) represent an attempt to assess 
faking behavior across different contexts and situations (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). In 
this sense, it is more like a disposition than a measure of conscious response distortion 
elicited by the situation (Christiansen, 1998; Smith & Ellingson, 2002). Difference 
scores based on comparisons between scores from different conditions are another 
popular way of measuring faking, since they are seen as more objective. However, they 
are subject to a number of statistical issues (Edwards, 2001). A third way of measuring 
faking is the use of self-reports (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Hurtz & Bohon, 1997): 
simply asking individuals to estimate the extent to which they distorted their responses 
on a given test. Compared to lie scales, difference scores and self-report measures of 
faking tend to be very situation-specific and predict who is more likely to fake within a 
given context (McFarland & Ryan, 2006). 
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 However it is defined (cross-situation or situation-specific), faking has the 
potential to affect the validity of the selection processes used by organizations, 
especially integrity tests. Test scores may have long-lasting effects on individual 
outcomes. False positive decisions could mean the hiring of individuals who are prone to 
engage in dishonest behaviors in the employment setting; false negatives associated with 
low integrity test scores not only lead to rejection for the position, but imply the 
applicant was dishonest, a serious social stigma (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006). For these 
reasons, deliberate faking is a particularly important issue for applicant selection systems 
in general, and integrity tests in particular. 
 Unfortunately, there appears to be little agreement about the impact of faking on 
the validity of selection tests, perhaps due to inconsistencies in the way faking has been 
assessed (for example, lie scales, difference scores, and self-reports). Some research has 
found that response distortion has little to no effect on criterion-related validity (e.g., 
Ones et al., 1996; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006), and that corrections for it do not change 
criterion-related validities (Hough, 1998; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998a; Schmitt & 
Oswald, 2006). Schmitt and Oswald (2006) concluded that given typical selection 
scenarios, removing respondents displaying high levels of response distortion has 
minimal impact on mean performance at the aggregate level. These findings have led 
some authors to take a dim view of the need for additional faking research (e.g., 
Morgeson et al., 2007). 
 However, a growing body of literature suggests that conclusions about the 
innocuousness of faking are premature, particularly in the case of integrity tests (Griffith 
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& McDaniel, 2006). In their recent review of the use of personality-based selection tests, 
Morgeson et al. (2007) cite a number of studies which find that faking can affect hiring 
decisions, especially in situations with low selection ratios and top-down selection 
procedures. Other research has found that faking introduces construct-irrelevant variance 
and can degrade test validity (Griffith, 1998), and that the differences between applicant 
and non-applicant settings can affect the construct-related validity of selection tests 
(Stark, Chernyshenko, Chan, Lee, & Drasgow, 2001). 
 Finally, psychometric studies have shown that tests with similar levels of 
predictive validity at the test level may have different measurement properties that can 
affect the accuracy of the selection test and the quality of selection decisions being 
made. Millsap (2007) has pointed out that regression (predictive) invariance is separate 
from factorial (measurement) invariance; thus, it is possible to have a construct with the 
same predictive validity for two groups (for example, faking and non-faking applicants) 
but for mean differences in the construct between the groups to result in a selection 
decision which favors one group over another, even when the predictive validity of a test 
is the same for the two groups. This has the effect of reducing the sensitivity of the 
selection test and increasing bias in selection rates (Millsap, 2007), and suggests that 
faking could be a problem even if there was no negative effect on criterion-related 
validity coefficients. 
 Beyond the conflicting evidence in the literature, there are a number of 
conceptual issues with the current research which suggest that additional research on 
faking is warranted, especially with regard to overt integrity tests. First, existing faking 
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research has been based on a wide variety of terms and concepts, including faking, social 
desirability, response distortion, and impression management. These different terms 
have sometimes been used interchangeably (e.g., Ones et al., 1995; Ones et al., 1996; 
Rosse et al., 1998). This confusion makes it difficult to assess the generalizability and 
value of previous research, given that different researchers have used the same term to 
refer to fundamentally different response distortion processes. Hence, the lack of 
consistent terminology and operational definitions of the phenomenon represents a 
potential source of inconclusive or contradictory results (Griffith & McDaniel, 2006; 
Rosse et al., 1998). Moreover, most of these results are based on studies of personality 
tests, not overt integrity tests, which comprise different content and items (Murphy, 
2000). 
 There have also been inconsistencies in the way that faking is measured. Some 
researchers have used lie scales such as the BIDR (Paulus, 1991) to operationalize 
faking (Rosse et al., 1998); others have used experimental manipulations of response 
instructions (Griffith et al., 2006; Ryan & Sackett, 1987) and difference scores 
(McFarland & Ryan, 2000) or self-reports (Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Hurtz & Bohon, 
1997). Given the known limitations and problems with the use of lie scales and related 
measures (Alliger & Dwight, 2000; Hurtz & Alliger, 2002; McFarland & Ryan, 2000), it 
is not entirely clear whether the conflicting conclusions of faking research are partly the 
result of differences in how faking is measured. Research that includes multiple 
operationalizations could help provide results that generalize across different types of 
faking, or identify limitations in these measures. Moreover, unlike personality-based 
13 
 
tests, overt integrity tests do not attempt to hide their purpose and do not always contain 
lie scales (Sackett & Harris, 1984); therefore, the conclusions of research based on 
covert or personality-based tests may not necessarily apply to overt integrity tests. 
 A third issue is that deliberate faking, regardless of its effect on test performance 
and predictive validity, represents a dishonest behavior. An individual willing to engage 
in one type of dishonest behavior may be more likely to engage in other types of 
dishonest behaviors – in fact, this is the entire premise behind questions about past 
behaviors on overt integrity tests. Thus, even if faking has a limited effect on the ability 
of a test to predict future job performance, it is possible that the increased selection of 
individuals willing to lie on a test could increase the frequency of behaviors such as theft 
or other serious CWBs (Patterson, DeBaryshe, & Ramsey, 1989) over an individual’s 
tenure in the organization. 
Current findings in faking research  
 Based on these issues, further research on faking appears to be warranted. In the 
faking literature, several topics have proven to be of central importance. One such issue 
is the extent to which applicants are able to fake, and whether or not they actually do so. 
Another, equally important issue is the extent to which faking on selection tests affects 
the quality of selection decisions made on the basis of that test. 
 Overall, research suggests that test takers are both willing and able to fake on 
integrity measures (Cunningham et al., 1994; Ones et al., 1996; Robie, Brown & Beaty, 
2007; Ryan & Sackett, 1987). The dominant method in studies that examine whether 
people are able to fake are controlled experiments (using both between- and within-
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subjects designs) that compare mean integrity test scores obtained under instructions to 
respond honestly to those obtained under instructions to fake in various ways (e.g., 
Sackett & Wanek, 1996). Research that compares scores generated from such 
instructions has been used to demonstrate the extent to which test takers can fake. 
Ryan and Sackett (1987) were among the first to show that test takers are able to 
follow instructions to fake, respond honestly, or to respond as applicants. The results 
revealed that participants who were instructed to fake good could easily do so, scoring a 
full standard deviation above the overall mean. However, those instructed to respond as 
job applicants provided responses more similar to those from the “honest” condition than 
the “fake good” condition. While a 24% difference was found between the faking good 
group and the honest group, only an 8% difference was found between the job applicant 
group and the honest group.  A more recent study showed that honest responders take 
less time to complete and make fewer corrections to their personality inventories than 
faking responders (Robie et al., 2007), and that respondents may be categorized into one 
of three different categories: honest responders, slight fakers, and extreme fakers. 
 According to a current review of integrity testing research (Berry et al., 2007), 
there appears to be a consensus that respondents are able to fake when instructed to do 
so. However, there is some concern about the extent to which sample type might affect 
the degree of faking displayed by test takers (i.e., whether applicants might fake more 
than a student sample and whether applicants might fake more than incumbents). 
Research on personality tests suggests that sample type (e.g., applicant versus 
incumbents) can affect mean differences by as much as .50 SD (Hough, 1998; Hough et 
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al., 1990). In another study on pre-employment personality tests, Rosse et al. (1998) 
found that job applicants engaged in response distortion on more items than incumbents, 
and that applicants were able to distinguish between items that did or did not reflect job-
relevant information. Among job applicants who were hired, 87% had extremely high 
response distortion scores on the test, especially on items that were job-related. 
 In another study of overt integrity test scores of managerial applicants and 
incumbents, Van Iddekinge, Raymark, Eidson, and Putka (2003) found that applicants 
only scored .09 SD higher than incumbents, suggesting the integrity test was resistant to 
faking. In a recent meta-analysis, Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Brannick, and Smith 
(2006) found that job applicants scored higher than non-applicants on extraversion, 
emotional stability, conscientiousness and openness. They interpret these mean 
differences as measures of faking, and note that the degree of faking on each dimension 
varied depending on job type. 
 In a more recent study, Hogan et al. (2007) collected data from job applicants 
who completed a personality test twice – individuals completed the application process 
once, were turned down, and reapplied 6 months later. Participants included over 5,200 
rejected applicants (from a population of over 260,000 applicants) who applied for a 
customer service job with a nationwide U.S. employer in the transportation industry. 
Although the applicants had increased experience with the test and demonstrated 
motivation to get the job, Hogan et al. (2007) found that about 5% of the rejected 
applicants improved their scores on the second administration more than would be 
predicted by chance. The study also found that social skills, social desirability, and a 
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covert measure of integrity were significant predictors of change in the personality test 
scores. 
 However, research by Griffith et al., (2007) found that 30%-50% of applicants 
elevated their scores when applying for a job, with applicant scores that fell outside the 
95% confidence interval established by their honest scores. They also found that faking 
had substantial effects on hiring decisions: at a .5 selection ratio, 31% of applicants who 
were hired on the basis of their applicant test scores would not have been hired on the 
basis of their scores as incumbents. At a .1 selection ratio, 66% of applicants who would 
have been selected on the basis of their applicant test scores had faked their way to the 
top. Thus, Griffith et al. (2007) showed that faking can have substantial effects on rank 
ordering and hiring decisions in applicant settings. Given Griffith et al.’s (2007) finding 
that a high percentage of applicants are able to alter their test scores as applicants, it is 
possible that Hogan et al.’s (2007) results might be attributable to the rejected applicants 
simply being bad at impression management. In fact, some of the rejected applicants 
received lower scores on the second administration of the same test.  
 The second major issue in faking research is whether or not faking affects the 
validity of selection procedures. In this area, there have been a number of studies; 
several of them have supported the idea that faking harms test validity, but a number of 
influential studies have found little to no effect of faking. 
 Some have argued that the effects of faking are minimal, based on studies 
showing little or no faking-related attenuation in criterion-related validities (e.g., Barrick 
& Mount, 1996; Hough et al., 1990; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998a). Cunningham et al. 
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(1994) found that while people can and do fake, integrity tests possess predictive validity 
in spite of impression management. In a series of meta-analyses, Ones et al. (1993; 
1996) found performance criterion validities of .40 for applicants and .29 for 
incumbents, and found that response distortion did not attenuate or suppress the 
predictive validity of integrity tests. This suggests that validities under conditions most 
associated with the motivation to fake (e.g., applicant settings) were not attenuated, but 
were actually 38% larger. In a military recruiting sample, Hough et al. (1990) measured 
faking effects using mean-level personality scores and response distortion scores of 
applicants and incumbents. Although subsequent analyses by Rynes (1993) found that 
29% of participants faked, Hough et al. (1990) found only small differences in criterion-
related ability associated with faking on personality tests. 
 However, a number of researchers have pointed out that faking may have 
substantive effects on selection system outcomes even in the absence of direct effects on 
criterion-related validities, and that typical assessments of criterion-related validity are 
not sufficient to rule out the impact of faking. Instead, the effects of faking should be 
studied through an examination of the quality of individual hiring decisions (Alliger & 
Dwight, 2000).  
 Researchers have noted that the sensitivity of criterion-related validity 
coefficients to faking is influenced by the size of the applicant pool, whether top down 
strategies are used, and the selection ratio (e.g., Donovan et al., 2003; Rosse et al., 
1998). Under top-down selection strategies, even if only a few individuals fake, those 
who fake will rise to the top of the distribution and will increase their chances of being 
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hired, regardless of the overall validity coefficient (Donovan et al., 2003). In this 
scenario, successful fakers actually possess a lower “true score” on the target construct 
than their test scores would indicate (Donovan et al., 2003), increasing the probability of 
a false positive hiring decision. For instance, Rosse et al. (1998) found that the 
percentage of job applicants with elevated faking scores increased as selection ratios 
decreased, and that corrections for faking affected the rank order of applicants, and 
simulation studies by Zickar and Drasgow (1996) and Zickar (2000) found that test 
takers who faked were disproportionately ranked among the top applicants, despite few 
changes in the observed validity coefficient. 
 Mueller-Hanson, Heggestad, and Thornton (2003) used an experiment in an 
applied setting to examine the effect of personality test faking on criterion-related 
validity and the quality of selection. They found that the incentive condition (in which 
test takers were given a $20 incentive) had more prediction errors among those with 
scores at the high end of the selection test score distribution. The mean difference 
between the control and incentive groups on the personality test was .41 SD. This same 
study also indicated that, as the selection ratio decreased, examinees from the “honest” 
condition were selected proportionally less often than examinees from the “incentive” 
group (36% versus 64% at a selection ratio of .10). Finally, their results showed that 
when the selection ratio was small, individuals in the “incentive” condition were also 
likely to have lower mean levels of performance than those in the “honest” condition. 
 Overall, these studies suggest that faking will continue to play an important role 
in selection test research and applications – including integrity testing – contrary to 
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recent statements about the potential futility of faking research (see Griffith & 
McDaniel, 2006; Morgeson et al., 2007). Specifically, research on faking has shown that 
individuals can and do fake, and that faking can affect selection decisions. However, less 
is known about the specific processes involved in individual decisions to engage in 
impression management behaviors on selection tests, or how that process is affected by 
individual differences like personality or cognitive ability. Thus, an important next step 
in faking research is the development of models of faking behavior for various non-
cognitive selection measures, such as integrity tests. Some initial attempts to develop 
such models have been proposed in the case of personality tests; these will be reviewed 
in the next section, and will serve as the basis for a model of some of the major causes 
and consequences of faking on overt integrity tests. 
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A MODEL OF FAKING DECISIONS 
 Recently, a number of authors have suggested that attitudes towards faking might 
be used as a proxy for the intent to fake and the likelihood of engaging in faking (Rees & 
Metcalfe, 2003) and play an important role in the decision to fake (McFarland, 2000). 
According to this perspective, faking is the result of individual decisions or intentions 
based on individual attitudes and cognitions towards faking (Mueller-Hanson et al., 
2006; Snell, Sydell, & Lueke, 1999). Empirical support for this perspective has been 
found in at least two prior studies. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) found that attitudes and 
cognitions towards faking predicted willingness to fake, and McFarland (2000) found 
that faking on a Big Five measure of personality (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1989, cf. 
McFarland, 2000) could be explained by individual intentions to fake, which were 
related to individual cognitions and attitudes towards faking. 
 However, individual cognitions towards faking, faking behaviors, and even the 
end result of such faking may be influenced by a number of individual differences; and 
faking itself is not necessarily a unitary construct. Thus, the proposed model integrates a 
cognitive/decision-theoretic model of faking on overt integrity tests with research on key 
individual differences, taking into account critical distinctions among faking criteria. At 
the heart of the proposed model is Ajzen’s (1985; 1991) theory of planned behavior 
(TPB), which has been used for decades to study the link between cognitions and 
behavior. 
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Theory of planned behavior 
 According to the TPB, behaviors are a function of three behavior-specific 
attitudes and cognitions, mediated by intentions. Although widely used in other 
behavioral contexts, the TPB has rarely been used to study faking in the context of 
selection tests, with two relatively recent exceptions. McFarland (2000) found that 
faking behaviors on four of the five NEO-FFI scales (neuroticism, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness) were predicted by intention to fake, and that 
intention to fake was significantly (albeit weakly) related to individual attitudes towards 
faking and perceived behavioral control, but not social norms. More recently, Mueller-
Hanson et al. (2006) found that a common factor represented by the three TPB-related 
cognitions was a strong predictor of intentions to fake (β = .99, p < .01), which was itself 
a strong predictor of faking behavior on a five-factor model test of personality (β = .70, p 
< .01). 
 These results confirm that faking cognitions can be a significant factor in the 
decision to fake. However, the results of the larger study by McFarland (2000) are 
slightly mixed. While intentions to fake were related to applicant-honest difference 
scores on some personality measures (especially conscientiousness and agreeableness), 
relationships were generally small, with large variation in the correlation between 
intentions and faking behavior across the different measures of personality (r from .00 to 
.20). 
 These results also suggest that intentions to fake are not equally good predictors 
of applicant faking behavior across different types of tests, and that the appropriateness 
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of a TPB-based model of faking may be moderated by the content of the test. One major 
difference in test content is the nature of the items used on the test: meanings of items on 
overt (i.e., clear-purpose) tests are more obvious than those on covert (i.e., personality-
based) tests, by definition. This implies that, compared to personality-based tests, 
applicant decisions to fake could be even more important for overt integrity tests. 
 A second difference between overt integrity tests and other non-cognitive 
measures is the nature of the construct: integrity has clear overlap with 
conscientiousness and neuroticism (Ones, 1994), but has particularly powerful meanings 
attached to high and low test performance. A person who receives low scores on an overt 
integrity tests receives strongly negative value-based labels like “thief,” “liar,” or 
“unethical.” By contrast, low scores on personality-based tests (even on related 
constructs like conscientiousness) do not always carry such clearly negative 
connotations; responses to certain items could be interpreted as either “disorganized” or 
“big picture person.” 
 Together, these two factors suggest the possibility that intentions to fake will be 
more easily translated into increased scores for overt integrity tests. If this is true, then 
the TPB would be even more appropriate for such tests than for other non-cognitive 
measures. This would explain the mixed findings of McFarland (2000) and expand on 
the results of Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006). 
 In this proposed study, the TPB (Figure 1) was used to predict intentions to 
distort responses (i.e., fake) and subsequent applicant faking behavior on an overt 
integrity test. The framework identifies three cognitive components (attitudes, social 
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norms and perceived behavior control) that are believed to jointly predict the intention to 
perform a given behavior, with intention mediating the effects of the three cognitive 
components on the actual behavior (Ajzen, 1985; 1991; and Ajzen & Madden, 1986). 
Beck and Ajzen (1991) found that attitudes regarding several types of dishonesty are 
related to intentions to behave in a dishonest manner. Positive attitudes toward a 
behavior are linked to stronger intentions to perform that behavior. This study will assess 
whether individual attitudes towards faking, subjective faking norms, and perceived 
behavioral control over faking explain variance in faking on pre-employment integrity 
tests, and whether these effects are mediated by individual intentions to fake. A 
description of these individual components is presented below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
 
 
 Attitudes refer to an individual’s evaluative appraisal of the behavior in question. 
It has been found that positive attitudes toward a behavior lead to greater intentions to 
perform that behavior. For example, Beck and Ajzen (1991) found that attitudes toward 
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dishonest actions predicted intentions to cheat on a test, shoplift, and lie. It is expected 
that these results will generalize to faking on an integrity test. 
 Subjective norms refer to perceived social pressure to engage in a given 
behavior. Studies on the TPB have consistently shown that when subjective norms 
toward a behavior are positive, the intention to perform that behavior will be greater 
(Ajzen, 1991, Schifter & Ajzen, 1985). For example, when individuals perceive that 
important others (e.g., parents or friends) approve of the behavior under consideration, 
they should be more likely to intend to engage in that behavior (Ajzen, 1991). It is 
expected that these results will generalize to faking on an integrity test, such that those 
who have more positive subjective norms toward faking will be more likely to have the 
intention to fake on the test. 
 The third variable in the TPB framework is perceived behavioral control. 
According to Ajzen (1991), this variable is similar to Bandura’s perceived self-efficacy 
(Bandura, 1986; 1991). Perceived behavioral control refers to an individual’s 
perceptions of their ability to perform a given behavior. If the person believes they can 
perform the behavior with ease, he or she would be more likely to intend to behave in 
that manner. In this study, it is expected that those who perceive themselves to have 
greater control over faking behavior will have a greater intention to fake. 
 Finally, greater intentions to perform a behavior increase the likelihood that the 
behavior is performed (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Beck & Ajzen, 1991; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Intentions predict a wide variety of behaviors, from losing 
weight (Shifter & Ajzen, 1985) to stealing (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). Intentions to fake will 
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be positively related to attempts to engage in faking behavior, so people with a greater 
intention to fake will fake more extensively on the test.  
 It is expected that the more favorable the attitude and the subjective norm, and 
the greater the perceived control, the more a person should be likely to intend to engage 
in a behavior. Taken together, the current research suggests that: 
 H1: Intentions to fake will mediate the relationship of applicant faking  
  behaviors with attitudes, social norms, perceived behavioral control. 
Specifically, attitudes towards faking, perceived social norms towards faking, and 
perceived behavioral control over faking will predict intentions to fake on an overt 
integrity test. Intentions to fake will predict actual faking behavior on overt integrity 
tests. In addition, this study will rely on multiple operationalizations of faking, which 
will provide information on the extent to which the model may be generalized across 
different measures of faking, including difference scores, self-reports, and lie scale 
measures. 
Faking behaviors and overt integrity test performance 
 With the TPB, the model provides a potential explanation for the way in which 
cognitions about faking on selection tests translate into actual faking behaviors. 
However, faking behaviors are primarily of interest to employers and researchers 
because of the potential effect they have on observed applicant test performance. In 
order to understand how individual faking behaviors on integrity tests translate into 
applicant test performance, research suggests that two separate aspects of faking play an 
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important role: applicant faking behavior (which might also be referred to as motivated 
faking or typical faking) and faking ability. 
 Applicant faking behavior reflects “typical” or “will do” faking, of the sort 
expected to arise from the level of motivation induced by a selection context. This is the 
aspect of faking most studies of applicant faking measure. More recently, studies of 
faking have begun to pay attention to a second aspect of faking – ability to fake. Faking 
ability is the extent to which an individual is able to successfully fake on the test, 
regardless of their actual inclination to do so in a job application context. Thus, it 
represents “can do” or “maximal” faking on a selection test. Faking ability has been 
operationalized two primary ways: first, through measures of test knowledge (e.g., 
McFarland, 2000; Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006); second, through the use of instructions 
to applicants to “beat” the test or maximize their score. 
 The distinction between will-do and can-do faking has previously been 
acknowledged as conceptually important. It has appeared in recent research, although 
studies have taken different views about their relationship and measured them in 
different ways. In a conceptual article, Snell et al. (1999) argued that successful selection 
test faking required both the motivation and ability to fake, and that different 
characteristics of the test, test-taker, or situation would ultimately influence the amount 
of successful faking observed on a given test. In their model, faking motivation and 
faking ability are expected to interact, since ability without motivation or motivation 
without ability are not expected to lead to successful faking. In other words, Snell et al. 
(1999) argue that faking on selection tests should display a similar relationship to the 
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classic “performance = motivation x ability” formula: increased ability should maximize 
the relationship between the applicant’s faking behaviors and their resulting test 
performance. 
 The relationship between “can-do” faking (faking ability) and “will-do” faking 
(applicant  faking) has been discussed in a small number of studies (for example, 
Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006), but the specific relationship between the two has rarely 
been tested. To the extent that empirical tests of their relationship have appeared in the 
literature, the results have been mixed. For example, McFarland (2000) found that 
increased knowledge about a selection test (by providing a description of the test 
constructs) actually weakened the relationship between faking intentions and faking 
behavior. Mueller-Hanson et al. (2006) found no evidence for any main effects of faking 
ability on faking intentions or faking behavior, or any relationship with faking 
motivation, but failed to test for any interactions of the sort predicted by earlier 
conceptual work on non-cognitive faking (McFarland, 2000; Snell et al., 1999). Despite 
the lack of empirical evidence, the basic premise articulated by Snell et al. (1999) 
remains: both ability and motivation are conceptually necessary in order to successfully 
fake on a selection test. Thus, existing research leads to the following two hypotheses: 
 H2: Increased applicant faking will result in elevated integrity test scores. 
 H3: Faking ability will moderate the effects of applicant faking on test  
  performance, such that individuals who engage in faking and have a high  
  ability to do so will outperform those who have a low ability to do so. 
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Individual differences and faking 
 Another area the faking literature suggests requires additional attention is the role 
played by individual differences in explaining observed individual-level variation in 
faking. The effect of individual differences on faking may occur at a number of different 
stages in the faking process. For example, individuals who are more conscientious or 
display greater levels of trait honesty may have different perceptions of the frequency or 
acceptability of faking behavior among their peers, due to either self-selection or social 
influence effects. Individuals who are less honest or conscientious may differ in the 
extent to which they believe such behaviors have negative consequences. There are a 
number of individual differences which theoretical and empirical research suggest might 
lead to individual variance in faking and, ultimately, integrity test scores. 
 Conscientiousness. One of the most potentially relevant predictors of integrity 
test faking behavior is conscientiousness, as research has reported links to both faking 
and integrity. For example, McFarland and Ryan (2000) found that individuals with 
higher conscientiousness scores had lower rates of faking (r = - .57) in an applicant 
instruction condition. Conscientiousness is also one of the core constructs measured by 
personality-based integrity tests (Hogan & Brinkmeyer, 1997; Sackett & Wanek, 1996; 
Wanek et al., 2003). However, research also shows that conscientiousness predicts 
attitudinal-based (i.e., “overt”) integrity tests (Berry et al., 2007), not just trait-based 
integrity. In other words, individuals higher in conscientiousness are less likely to report 
attitudes consistent with low levels of integrity. In the context of the current model, this 
implies that: 
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 H4: Higher levels of conscientiousness will predict more negative attitudes  
  towards integrity test faking behaviors. 
 Cognitive ability. Successful faking on self-report measures such as integrity 
tests imply several conditions (Morgeson et al., 2007): that test-takers have sufficient 
self-insight to accurately respond to an item, that they understand the item as intended, 
and that they consciously deviate from the truth so they can create a specific impression. 
That is, successful faking is presumed to involve some level of ability (1) to understand 
written items on the test and identify the key concepts they contain, and (2) to reason 
about those concepts and their relationship to employer desires. In terms of individual 
differences which might be expected to predict these factors, the most obvious is general 
mental ability. 
 Cognitive ability has significant links to a number of lower-order factors that 
may affect the likelihood of successful faking attempts, such as language comprehension 
and lexical ability, memory and learning, inductive reasoning, among other factors 
(Carroll, 1993; Deary, 2000). There is also empirical evidence to support this 
relationship. For example, Brown and Cothern (2002) found that cognitive ability was a 
significant predictor of faking success, and Alliger, Lilenfeld, and Mitchell (1996) found 
that intelligence and the ability to fake an overt integrity test were significantly 
correlated (r = .36). More recently, the review by Berry et al. (2007) described recent 
research that has found a relationship between faking and cognitive ability. 
 Beyond its direct effect on the ability to fake, cognitive ability also has the 
potential to affect individual differences in perceived behavioral control. For instance, 
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Bell and Kozlowski (2002) found that cognitive ability is related to individual’s 
perceptions of their ability and self-efficacy. That is, people with greater levels of ability 
tend to have greater beliefs in their ability to perform a task. Based on this research, it is 
therefore expected that: 
 H5: Higher levels of cognitive ability will be associated with a higher ability  
  to fake, and 
 H6: Higher levels of cognitive ability will be associated with increased  
  perceptions of behavioral control over faking. 
Faking behaviors and overt integrity test validity 
 Ultimately, any process model of integrity test faking needs to take into account 
the effect that faking has on the validity of inferences drawn from the observed test 
scores. In the most recent review of the literature on integrity testing, Berry et al. (2007) 
review research showing that integrity tests are valid predictors for a number of criteria, 
such as CWBs – including rule breaking, theft, and cheating in a laboratory setting. In 
addition, meta-analytic approaches (Ones et al., 1993) have shown that integrity test 
scores are substantial predictors of supervisor ratings of performance (ρ = .35), self-
admissions of narrow and broad criteria of counterproductive work behavior (ρ = .58), 
and various narrow criteria of theft (ρ = .52). However, research on the effect of faking 
on integrity test validity has been less clear. 
 Ones and colleagues (1996; 1998a) provided evidence suggesting that scores on 
social desirability scales did not moderate the ability of integrity tests to predict 
supervisory ratings of job performance. They also found that including social desirability 
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scores did not appear to reduce the ability of integrity test scores to successfully predict 
training performance (ρ = .36) or CWBs (ρ = .32). However, these results were based on 
20 studies, used only social desirability scale scores (i.e., the meta-analysis included no 
measures of actual faking behavior), and did not differentiate between the effects of 
social desirability scores on overt integrity tests or personality-based tests. In a 
subsequent study, Jackson, Wroblewski, and Ashton (2000) found that “typical” (i.e., 
will-do) faking reduced the criterion-related validity coefficients of an integrity test with 
self-report CWBs from r = .48 to r = .18. Thus, the overall picture with regard to faking 
behaviors and the validity of integrity tests is unclear.  
 Although the existing evidence is unclear, from a psychometric perspective, 
factors that affect the quality of measurement are expected to have an effect on a 
measure’s criterion-related validity, and faking behaviors represent a significant source 
of response distortion and bias. Even in the case where predictive validity is not 
substantially harmed, Millsap (1997; 2007, see also Borsboom, 2006) has noted that 
measurement issues may still affect selection criteria, by reducing the sensitivity of the 
selection test – and, as a result – the accuracy of the decisions made using that 
instrument. In the area of personality testing, these conclusions have been supported by 
others (e.g., Morgeson et al., 2007). Thus, to the extent that individuals are able to 
successfully fake on an overt integrity test, support for the following hypothesis is 
expected: 
 H7: Increased levels of applicant faking are expected to moderate the  
  relationship between observed integrity test scores and CWBs, with  
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  increased levels of faking reducing the strength of the relationship. 
Additional potential effects of faking 
 Another way of looking at the validity of integrity tests is through the quality of 
hiring decisions being made (Christiansen, Goffin, Johnston, & Rothstein, 1994; Rosse 
et al., 1998). Morgeson et al. (2007) note that faking on personality tests may do more 
than simply raise scores – to the extent that individuals may fake differently on the basis 
of their individual differences and their situations, and that these individual differences 
in faking may result in changes to the rank order of applicants. In the case of overt 
integrity tests, even if measures of predictive validity are robust to applicant faking, the 
quality of employment decisions being made on the basis of the test will be a function of 
many factors such as selection ratios, the type of decision being made (e.g., top down 
selection versus other systems), and the extent to which individuals differentially 
increase their scores on the test. 
 To add to the complexity of this area of study, research on faking suggests that 
not only do individuals fake, but that that some individuals fake more than others. For 
example, Griffith et al. (2007) found substantial individual variance in the magnitude of 
changes in test scores between applicants versus incumbents who were instructed to 
respond honestly. Looking at just the top ten applicants out of a total of 60, effect sizes 
associated with applicant responding (i.e., motivated faking) ranged from .11 to 1.54. 
This broad range of scores suggests that there is substantial variance in individual 
faking, even for a narrow band of scores on a measure of conscientiousness. 
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 Other studies have found that – regardless of mixed findings on the effects of 
faking with respect to criterion-related validity – faking can still have substantial effects 
on the measurement properties of the test. Stark et al. (2001) found that personality and 
impression management scales both exhibited substantial differential item functioning 
(DIF), and some degree of differential test functioning (DTF), leading them to conclude 
that each test contained items that favored one group (applicants or non-applicants) over 
another, which could lead to observable differences at the test level. In addition to mean 
level differences, they found that the situation (applicant versus non-applicant) affected 
the construct-related validity of the personality and impression management scales, and 
that applicant samples showed lower levels of reliability, consistent with previous 
research. 
 Additional research by Zickar (2000) and Zickar and Drasgow (1996) came to 
similar conclusions; in a series of simulations, they found that even though faking may 
not necessarily affect the overall validity coefficients, individuals who faked tended to 
be overrepresented in the top scores of the test. They also found that even low levels of 
faking could potentially have large effects on rank orders – when 5% of a hypothetical 
sample consisted of “slight fakers”, such fakers made up 15% of the top scorers on the 
test. Fakers also appeared to have lower “true levels” of the target trait than honest 
responders who were also top scorers. 
 According to Zickar (2000), individuals who endorsed less positive response 
options when responding honestly were likely to endorse the same option when 
responding in a situation in which they were asked to fake. In other words, honest 
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individuals may fake less than others, even when asked to do so. This result is aligned 
with previous results showing that higher levels of conscientiousness are associated with 
a lower willingness to fake (Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006) and that impression 
management scores across different instructional conditions (often used as an indicator 
of faking; see McFarland & Ryan, 2006) reflect more of an individual trait than a 
situational variable. Thus, there appears to be evidence for significant individual 
differences in faking, even in the face of similar situational pressures introduced by 
different instructional conditions. To the extent that there are individual differences in 
responses to situational pressures to fake, research suggests the following hypothesis: 
 H8: Increased levels of applicant faking should be associated with differences  
  in the rank order of individual integrity test scores, such that instructions  
  to fake will alter the rank order of individual integrity test scores. 
 Figure 2 provides an overview of the model based on the different hypotheses, 
describing how the various cognitive, behavioral, individual differences, and outcome 
variables are hypothesized to relate to one another. 
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Figure 2. Overall model of proposed relationships and associated hypotheses 
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METHOD 
 To test the various hypotheses, two separate studies were conducted, using 
slightly different sets of measures and administrations (see below for details). The 
inclusion of a second study allowed for the use of an additional measure of cognitive 
ability that was not available in Study 1. The variations in administrations also provided 
some information on potential issues related to priming and temporal stability. 
Participants 
 Study 1. A total of 289 undergraduates from a large southwestern university were 
recruited for Study 1. Of these individuals, 233 returned approximately 1 week later to 
complete the study at Time 2, so the attrition rate from Time 1 to Time 2 was 19%. The 
majority of participants were Caucasian (75%) and female (67%), with some minority 
representation (Latino, 12%; Asian, 6%; African American, 5%). The majority of the 
sample contained first or second year students (29% freshmen; 35% sophomore), but 
substantial numbers of third and fourth years students also participated (23% junior; 
14% senior). 
 Many (67%) participants reported working at least 10 hours per week. This 
indicates that most had some recent experience in the workplace. Most (62%) of 
participants completed the applicant measures with a specific job in mind, of which 
roughly 40% involved retail or food service positions. Almost half of participants 
reported having taken similar employment tests in the past, but the use of such tests was 
not generally endorsed - only 38% agreed with the statement that “These sorts of tests 
should be used to select applicants.” The vast majority (92%) of respondents said they 
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responded honestly to items when instructed to do so, and a majority of students reported 
being motivated to take the test seriously by the rewards offered to participants [i.e., 
being the recipient of a $20 monetary award (56%) and earning extra credit toward their 
class (51%)]. 
 Study 2. For Study 2, a total of 187 participants from a large southwestern 
university were initially recruited. There was a 14% attrition rate, with 160 participants 
completing the full study at time 2. This sample was slightly more diverse in terms of 
ethnicity (70% Caucasian; 19% Latino; 5% Asian; 5% African American) and gender 
(54% female). The sample was more stratified in terms of student classification, 
containing nearly 60% freshmen, and only 17% sophomores. 
 The sample generally had less current work experience (45% reported working at 
least 10 hours per week). Fewer participants also reported that their responses to items 
were given with a specific job in mind (34%), but those who did tended to use similar 
jobs as a reference point for responses (44% thought of a retail/food job when answering 
items). As with the Study 1 sample, a large proportion of participants reported having 
some previous experience with these sorts of tests (48%), and less than half agreed that 
such tests should be used (42%). Most (98%) of participants reported responding to 
items truthfully when instructed to do so, and most were motivated by the opportunity to 
obtain a $20 monetary award (55%) and earn extra credit toward their class (97%). 
Measures 
 Conscientiousness. Conscientiousness was assessed using a 10-item scale from 
Goldberg (1999). This short public domain scale has been shown to correlate .79 with 
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the NEO conscientiousness scale (Goldberg, 1999). Coefficient alpha for Study 1 was 
.77; alpha for Study 2 was .80. Higher scores represent greater levels of 
conscientiousness. 
 Cognitive ability. Cognitive ability (or general mental ability, GMA) was 
measured in two different ways. First, it was measured using archival Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) scores (combined verbal and math) as a proxy for cognitive ability. 
Although imperfect, several authors have found substantial relationships between SAT 
scores and cognitive ability. Frey and Detterman (2004) found that composite SAT 
scores had a correlation of .72 with the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 1998a, cf. Frey & Detterman, 2004) test, corrected for range 
attenuation. They also found a correlation of .82 with the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery, another widely used proxy for cognitive ability. Rohde and Thompson 
(2007) found that composite SAT scores correlated .39 (uncorrected) with the Raven’s 
Advanced Progressive Matrices and .69 with the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scales (Raven, 
Raven, & Court, 1998b, cf. Frey & Detterman, 2004), a verbal-based test of general 
cognitive ability. SAT scores are used in both Study 1 and Study 2. 
 In Study 2, cognitive ability was also measured using the Wonderlic Personnel 
Test, a short test designed to offer measures of g for use in a variety of applicant settings. 
The internal consistency of the Wonderlic reported by the manual varies from .82 to .94 
(Wonderlic, 1992). Reliability in the current study was estimated at α = .80. 
 Integrity. Integrity was measured using the Employee Reliability Index (ERI), a 
multiple-choice employment-based overt integrity measure developed by Ryan and 
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Sackett (1987). The ERI is a research tool designed to closely mirror existing overt 
integrity measures. It consists of 74 items divided into three subscales: 52 items 
measuring integrity-related attitudes, 11 items measuring admission to theft, and 11 
items measuring social desirability. The social desirability scale is used to detect 
response distortion, and is not considered a part of the actual construct. The remaining 
63 items were used to measure overall integrity. In the honest condition, coefficient 
alpha reliabilities were .93 for Studies 1 and 2. For applicant conditions, alpha was 
between .92 and .94. For fake-good conditions, alpha was .96. 
 Typical faking behavior. Applicant faking behavior is measured in a variety of 
different ways, including difference scores (applicant condition minus honest condition), 
self-reports, and lie scale scores. 
 The most direct method of measuring faking is to use difference scores between 
scores produced in an applicant-response condition from scores produced in an honest-
response condition (see Ellingson, Sackett, & Hough, 1999; McDaniel, Douglas, & 
Snell, 1997; McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Difference scores are known to have a number 
of potential problems (Edwards, 2001), but have been used in the context of faking 
research. 
 Edwards (2001) cited two of the main issues of difference scores as possibly low 
reliability and unclear validity. Reliability of difference scores is a major issue since the 
reliability of the difference score is lower than either of the component tests, difference 
scores have the potential for low levels of internal consistency (for example, see 
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McFarland & Ryan, 2000). Reliabilities of the difference score were computed using the 
method described by McFarland and Ryan (2000): 
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where rdd is the reliability of the difference score and σ2d is the variance of the difference 
score. An analysis of the reliabilities showed that each of the difference score measures 
of typical faking behavior had acceptable reliabilities in both Study 1 (alpha = .78 for 
Time 1 and .89 for Time 2) and Study 2 (alpha = .87). 
 Edwards (2001) also acknowledged that the validity of difference scores could be 
checked empirically. This was done by conducting an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
which showed that difference scores and self-report faking behaviors had similarly high 
loadings on an overall faking factor (see below for details). This suggests that the 
difference scores demonstrated convergent validity. When combined with the acceptable 
levels of reliability, and the fact that difference scores may be conceptually appropriate 
when expecting a participant x treatment interaction (McFarland & Ryan, 2000), this 
suggests that difference scores may be an acceptable measure of faking. 
 Another way of measuring faking is the use of self-report questionnaires (Dwight 
& Donovan, 2003). Items for the self-report measure were obtained from McFarland 
(2000), who used the items as a manipulation check for an applicant test-taking 
condition. The items match closely to those used on similar self-report questionnaires 
designed to assess faking: for example, an item from McFarland (2000) reads “I 
intended to make myself look as good as possible on the employment selection test,” and 
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an item from Hurtz and Bohon (1997) reads “I purposefully tried to portray myself as an 
ideal applicant.” The measure consisted of seven items (alpha = .87) on a 5-point scale 
(strongly agree to strongly disagree). Higher scores represented greater levels of faking. 
 A third way of measuring typical faking behavior is the use of measures to detect 
or control faking, sometimes referred to as lie scales or social desirability scales. Scores 
were provided by the Impression Management subscale of the BIDR (Paulhus, 1991), 
which consists of 12 items on a 5-point scale (not true to very true); alpha reliability was 
.85. Lie scale scores are coded such that low scores represented dishonest behavior, and 
high scores represented honest behavior. 
 As a construct validity check, the three separate measures of faking behavior 
were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis (1 factor extracted, using maximum 
likelihood estimation), to identify the extent to which each of the measures was 
associated with a single overall factor of typical faking behavior. Results of Study 1 find 
that difference scores, self-reports, and lie scale scores have factor loadings of .79, .56, 
and -.29 on a single factor that explains over 52% of the variance in the three scores. In 
Study 2, these measures had factor loadings of .88, .58, and -.15, and explained 52% of 
the variance in the observed measures. These results indicate that the generalized faking 
behaviors measured by lie scale scores, although widely used to assess individual levels 
of typical or “will do” faking, do not appear to be capturing the same aspects of faking 
measured by the two situation-specific measures of faking, although the differences 
appear more substantial in Study 2. These patterns are consistent with the view that the 
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two types of measures capture different aspects of typical faking behavior than the lie 
scale. 
 Faking ability. Individual levels of faking ability were indexed by calculating 
integrity scores under maximal faking conditions minus integrity scores under honest 
conditions. Reliabilities of the difference scores were calculated as above, with adequate 
reliabilities for both Study 1 and Study 2 (alpha = .93). 
 Attitudes towards faking. Participants were asked to assess their attitudes toward 
faking by responding to a 5-item measure based on five different semantic differential-
type response scales: good-bad, pleasant-unpleasant, foolish-wise, useful-useless, and 
unattractive-attractive. An example item is “I think lying on an employment selection 
tests is: [good or bad]”. Reliability was .81 in Study 1 and .84 in Study 2. High scores 
represent favorable attitudes toward faking.  
 Social norms for faking. Social norms for faking were assessed using a 4-item 
measure on a 5-point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree). An example item is 
“Most people who are important to me would look down on me if I lied on a selection 
test.” Reliability was .78 for Study 1 and .73 for Study 2. High scores represent social 
norms in favor of faking.  
 Perceived behavioral control over faking. Perceptions of behavioral control over 
faking were measured using three items on a 5-point response anchor ranging from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. An example item is “It would be easy for me to lie 
on a selection test.” Reliability was .82 for Study 1 and .85 for Study 2. High scores 
represent high perceptions of behavioral control.   
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 Intention to fake. Intentions to fake on future employment selection tests were 
measured using ten items on a 5-point scale, ranging from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree. An example of this item is: “I would not lie on a pre-employment selection 
test.” Reliability was .85 for Study 1 and Study 2. High score represents greater intention 
to fake.  
 Self-report faking measure. Items for the self-report faking measure were 
obtained from McFarland (2000), who used the items as a manipulation check for an 
applicant test-taking condition. The items match closely to those used on similar self-
report questionnaires designed to assess faking (e.g., Dwight & Donovan, 2003; Hurtz & 
Bohon, 1997). An example is “I attempted to fake my responses on the employment 
selection test.” The measure consisted of seven items with alpha of .87, with high scores 
represented greater levels of faking attempted.  
 The distinction between intention to fake and self-report faking measure is that 
the intention items asked respondents about their intention to fake on a selection test in 
the future, while the self-report faking measure asked participants about their faking 
effort in reference to a test that they just took. Thus, the self-report faking items can be 
seen as an index of faking behavior on a specific test, while intention items refer to 
general faking on an abstract future test. 
 Counterproductive work behaviors. Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) 
were measured using a measure of workplace deviance from Bennett and Robinson 
(2000). The scale captures two different facets of deviations from organizational norms 
that harm the organization or other individuals (Robinson & Bennett, 1995): 
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organizational deviance and interpersonal deviance. The measure consists of 19 items on 
a 7-point frequency scale (never, once a year, twice a year, several times a year, 
monthly, weekly, or daily). Reliability for Study 1 was .90, and .91 for Study 2. Higher 
scores represent more frequent CWBs. 
Procedure 
 Both studies (Study 1 and Study 2) required applicants to participate in two 
separate sessions; these two sessions were spaced roughly 1 week apart. During Time 1, 
participants were asked to sign a consent form and a waiver of release form that allowed 
the researcher to access their Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) score from the university, 
complete demographic items, and items measuring TPB variables (attitudes, social 
norms, perceived behavioral control, and intentions). In Study 1, participants were also 
asked to complete an overt integrity test under three different conditions: (1) as an 
applicant, (2) honestly-as-possible, and (3) fake-good2. They were also asked to respond 
to a conscientiousness measure and the impression management aspect of the BIDR (the 
lie scale, though it was not labeled as such). Participants in Study 2 were asked to 
complete the Wonderlic Personnel Test, but were not asked to take the integrity test at 
Time 1. To improve participant motivation in the applicant and fake-good conditions, 
participants in each condition were told they would receive $20 if they were in the top 
15% of scorers on that test. (See Appendix A for instruction sets, Appendix B for details 
on specific measures, and Appendix C for a table describing the order of administration.) 
 
2
 McFarland (2000) reported that order effects in a TPB model of faking were not a concern, but meta-
analytic results (Edens & Arthur, 2000) showed that having participants respond to honest conditions first, 
then fake conditions makes them more effective distorters than using the reverse condition, which suggests 
that honest conditions ought not be given first. 
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 Participants were invited back for Time 2, about a week later. In Time 2, they 
were asked to complete the overt integrity test under three different conditions: (1) as an 
applicant, (2) honestly-as-possible, and (3) fake-good. They were also asked to complete 
another copy of the BIDR (lie scale), a questionnaire (self-report) measure of their 
faking behavior immediately after the integrity test in each condition. At the end of the 
study, participants were debriefed on the purpose and implication of the study, and told 
that they would be entered in a drawing for $20 prizes, instead of rewarded based on test 
scores. This was to avoid labeling winners as high on integrity and others as lower on the 
construct. 
 According to the TPB, the sooner behaviors are measured after attitudes and 
intentions, the stronger the relationship between them (Ajzen & Madden, 1986). Asking 
about faking immediately before the test might prompt some respondents to think about 
faking and thus increase the likelihood of faking; therefore a time delay such as one 
week is generally used as a means to prevent potential effects associated with priming 
(see McFarland & Ryan, 2006). However, there were additional integrity test 
administrations used in the Time 1 session of Study 1, which were administered 
immediately following the completion of the TPB and intention measures. While care 
was taken in the wording of instructions to avoid demand characteristics, the “respond as 
an applicant” condition was placed before the “respond honestly” condition, because the 
model under investigation is focused on applicant faking behavior; placing the applicant 
condition before the honest condition avoids diagnosticity effects or demand 
characteristics that could result in inflated applicant faking (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). 
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 Integrity scores were measured twice during Study 1. Separate analyses were 
conducted based on integrity scores at Time 1 and Time 2, and the overall results were 
very similar for the different hypotheses, suggesting that transient demand characteristics 
and priming were not likely to be a major factor in the results of the study. In addition, 
there were very similar levels of self-report faking across conditions for both Time 1 and 
2, suggesting that prior exposure to the test at Time 1 in Study 1 did not influence the 
extent to which respondents would fake at Time 2. Based on these results, and to ease 
interpretation, only the results of Time 2 are presented in the Results section3. 
 
3
 Results for Time 1 are available on request from the author. 
47 
 
STUDY 1 RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
 Means, standard deviations, and correlations for variables used in Study 1 are 
presented in Table 1. 
Manipulation checks 
 Self-report measures of faking were administered in each condition as a way to 
differentiate the degree of faking attempts across test-taking conditions. To the extent 
that individuals followed instructions for each condition, self-reported faking scores 
should vary significantly across conditions. A repeated measures analysis of variance 
(RM-ANOVA) and follow-up comparisons found significant differences in the mean 
level of self-reported faking behaviors across different conditions, F(2, 474) = 126.1, p < 
.01; η2 = .35, with significant differences between each condition (p < .01). 
 Table 2 shows there is at least half of a SD difference in the mean of each pair of 
self-reported faking behaviors. These differences suggest that participants understood 
the instruction sets, and engaged in different levels of faking across the three conditions. 
In addition, self-reported levels of faking for the applicant condition were not related to 
self-reported faking in the honest condition (r = -.01, p > .05), but were moderately 
related to self-reports of faking behavior in the fake-good condition (r = .28, p < .01) . 
This further supports that instructional sets elicited different faking efforts across 
conditions.
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Table 1 
Study 1 correlation matrix 
 
Variable  N Mean (SD)   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 13 
(1) SAT  286 1028 (367)   
(2) CON  286 3.6 (.55) -.11  .77 
(3) ATT  286 1.8 (.69) -.01 -.29**  .81 
(4) SN  286 2.1 (.80) -.02 -.31**  .58**  .78 
(5) PBC  286 2.6 (.99)  .02 -.28**  .57**  .49**  .82 
(6) INTENT  286 2.8 (.64)  .04 -.28**  .70**  .55**  .60**  .85 
(7) HON (T1) 286 3.5 (.45) -.08  .32** -.40** -.41** -.47** -.44**  .92 
(8) APP (T1) 286 3.8 (.40) -.02  .25** -.36** -.35** -.39** -.35**  .64**  .92 
(9) FAKE (T1) 286 4.3 (.60)  .14*  .04 -.29** -.20** -.24** -.22**  .25**  .42**  .97 
(10) HON (T2) 231 3.6 (.45)  .01  .29** -.38** -.34** -.43** -.39**  .82**  .57**  .26**  .93 
(11) APP (T2) 231 4.0 (.42)  .04  .20** -.23** -.20** -.25** -.15*  .33**  .63**  .47**  .38**  .94 
(12) FAKE (T2) 231 4.3 (.59)  .12  .14* -.19** -.17* -.15** -.12  .21**  .29**  .62**  .31**  .46**  .96 
(13) MF (T1) 286 .27 (.36)  .07 -.12*  .10  .12*  .14**  .16** -.54**  .31**  .15** -.37**  .30**  .06  .78 
(14) MF (T2) 231 .42 (.48)  .02 -.10  .16*  .14*  .19**  .24** -.48**  .02  .17** -.59**  .52**  .12  .61** 
(15) SR-H  231 2.1 (.75) -.06 -.08  .22**  .16*  .17**  .22** -.18** -.25** -.31** -.21** -.38** -.29**   -.04 
(16) SR-A  230 2.7 (.86)  .07 -.18**  .21**  .16*  .25**  .31** -.29** -.06 -.01 -.32**  .16* -.06  .29** 
(17) SR-F  231 3.5 (1.3)  .06  .00 -.03 -.01  .08  .05 -.17* -.02  .11 -.16*  .13*  .14*  .18** 
(18) IM  286 3.2 (.79)  .03  .28** -.25** -.19** -.26** -.31**  .43**  .31**  .19**  .39**  .16*  .18**     -.19** 
(19) FA (T1) 286 .77 (.65)  .18* -.19**  .01  .09  .10  .10 -.46** -.05  .74** -.32**  .21**  .42**   .51** 
(20) FA (T2) 231 .72 (.62)  .11 -.08  .10  .09  .17**  .17** -.39** -.14*  .40** -.43**  .16*  .73**       .33** 
(21) log CWB 228 1.4 (.41) -.05 -.38**  .30**  .29**  .28**  .35** -.48** -.37** -.11 -.52** -.24** -.18**   .17* 
 
 
Variable  N Mean (SD)   14   15   16   17   18   19   20 21 
(14) MF (T2) 231 .42 (.48)  .89 
(15) SR-H  231 2.1 (.75) -.13*  .86 
(16) SR-A  230 2.7 (.86)  .44** -.01  .86 
(17) SR-F  231 3.5 (1.3)  .26** -.31**  .28**  .93 
(18) IM  286 3.2 (.79) -.22**  .02 -.16* -.41**  .84 
(19) FA (T1) 286 .77 (.65)  .48** -.15*  .19**  .22** -.13*  .94 
(20) FA (T2) 231 .72 (.62)  .54** -.13  .18**  .25** -.11  .64**  .93 
(21) log CWB 218 1.4 (.41)  .27**  .11  .13*  .12 -.39**  .22**  .22** .90 
 
 
Note: CON = conscientiousness; ATT = attitudes towards faking; SN = social norms; PBC = perceived behavioral control; HON = honest integrity score; APP = applicant integrity score; 
FAKE = maximal faking integrity score; MF = motivated faking; SR = self-report faking behavior for honest (H), applicant (A), and maximal faking (F) conditions; IM = lie scale; FA = 
faking ability; CWB = counterproductive work behaviors. 
 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 2 
Self-reports of faking across Study 1 conditions  
 
     Mean SD 1  2  3 4 
1. Intentions    2.75  .64    
2. Self-Report - Applicant  2.72  .86 .31** 
3. Self-Report - Honest  2.08  .75 .22**   -.01  
4. Self-Report - Fake   3.50 1.26 .05        .28** -.31** 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
Relationship between cognitions and intentions 
 As shown in Table 1, all three TPB variables were significantly correlated with 
intentions to fake (with respective correlations for attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control of .55, .60, and .70, p < .01). When intentions to fake was 
regressed on the three TPB variables, the three variables explained 57% of the variance 
in intentions to fake (Table 3); this provides evidence that the TPB predictors are strong 
predictors of intentions to fake on a selection test. Attitudes toward faking were the 
strongest predictor of intentions to fake, followed by PBC and subjective norms (see 
Table 3 below). These results are consistent with previous studies that use the TPB to 
study intentions; for example, a review of TPB studies by Ajzen (1991) found an 
average multiple correlation of .71, similar to the results of the present study (R = .75). 
 In addition, the correlations between TPB variables and intentions were much 
weaker for applicant self-reports of faking behavior than for pre-selection test intentions 
to fake (r = .21, .16, and .25 for attitudes, social norms, and perceived behavioral 
control, p > .05). The set of these three variables produced a multiple correlation of .27 
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Table 3 
Study 1 multiple regression analysis with intention to fake regressed onto attitudes, 
subjective norms, and PBC 
 
Model      β R R2     F   
      .75 .57 125.43** 
Attitude toward faking  .47** 
Subjective Norms toward faking .15** 
PBC toward faking   .26**   
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
 (R2 = .07) with self-reported faking behaviors in the applicant condition. This shows 
that cognitions towards faking are more strongly related to general pre-selection faking 
intentions than to specific post-test faking behaviors, which is a pattern to be expected 
based on the TPB. 
Hypothesis tests 
 The first hypothesis was that intentions should mediate the effect of the three 
TPB variables on applicant faking behaviors. Hypothesis 1 was tested using a series of 
hierarchical regressions; separate models were tested for different operationalizations of 
applicant faking behavior (i.e., applicant minus honest difference scores, self-report 
faking, and lie scale scores). Results are shown in Table 4. In each regression model, two 
steps were used to enter predictors of faking behavior4. 
 In the first model, the three theory of planned behavior variables (attitudes, social 
norms, and perceived behavioral control) were used to predict applicant faking behavior  
 
4
 Although difference scores appeared to provide an acceptable operationalization of faking, tests of 
change may also be based on alternative methods, such as residualized gain score analysis. Results of the 
analysis of residualized gain scores for H1 were nonsignificant for Study 1 and 2. 
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Table 4 
Study 1 hierarchical tests of mediation for different measures of faking 
 
 SN PBC ATT INT  R2 Adjusted R2   F df ∆R2 F(∆R2)  
DS     (model step 1)  .04  .14  .06   --  .04 .03 3.21 3 .04   3.21* 
DS     (model step 2)  .01  .07 -.03 .20*  .06 .04 3.56 4 .02   4.44* 
DS     (model step 3)   --   --   -- .24**  .06 .05 13.49 1 .06 13.49** 
DS     (model step 4)  .01  .07 -.03 .20*  .06 .04 3.56 4 .00    .29 
SR-A (model step 1)  .01  .20*  .09   --  .07 .06 5.73 3 .07  5.73** 
SR-A (model step 2) -.03  .11 -.02 .27**  .10 .09 6.59 4 .03  8.63** 
SR-A (model step 3)   --   --   -- .31**  .10 .09 24.67 1 .10 24.67** 
SR-A (model step 4) -.03  .11 -.02 .27**  .10 .09 6.59 4 .03    .61 
IM     (model step 1) -.03 -.17*  .13   --  .08 .07 8.54 3 .08   8.54** 
IM     (model step 2) -.00 -.11 -.03 -.23**  .10 .09 8.27 4 .02   6.95** 
IM     (model step 3)   --   --   -- -.31**  .10 .09 30.4 1 .10 30.4** 
IM     (model step 4) -.00 -.11 -.03 -.23**  .10 .09 8.27 4 .01    .89 
Note: DS = difference scores; SR-A = self-report applicant faking; IM = lie scale score (lower scores indicate greater lying). 
 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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(step 1); intentions to fake were then added to the model as a predictor (step 2). In the 
second model, the steps were reversed: in the first step, intentions to fake were used to 
predict applicant faking behaviors (step 3). In the next step, the three Theory of Planned 
Behavior variables were added to the model as predictors (step 4). For mediation 
between the set of predictors and the behavior to be supported, steps 1, 2, and 3 should 
explain significant levels of additional variance (∆R2), and step 4 should not be 
significant. 
 Hypothesis 1 was first tested using applicant faking behavior measured via 
applicant-honest difference scores at Time 2, as shown in Table 4. The model shows that 
the three Theory of Planned Behavior variables together predict significant levels of 
variance in Time 2 difference scores, and that adding intentions to fake as a predictor 
explains significant additional amounts of variation in Time 2 difference scores. 
Reversing the order of entry, the model shows that intentions to fake are a significant 
predictor of difference scores, but that once intentions to fake have been accounted for in 
the model, that the TPB variables no longer explain significant amounts of variance in 
applicant faking behavior, as measured using difference scores. These results support 
Hypothesis 1. 
 Hypothesis 1 was also tested using applicant self-reports of attempted faking 
behavior as a measure of applicant faking behavior. As shown in Table 4, the results 
supported Hypothesis 1: intentions to fake explained additional variance over and above 
the TPB variables, but the TPB variables did not predict significant levels of variance in 
faking behaviors after taking into account intentions. 
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 Finally, a third operationalization of faking behavior – lie scale scores – were 
used to test Hypothesis 1. Results are shown in Table 4, and provide further support of 
Hypothesis 1. Intentions explained significant additional variance in lie scales, over and 
above the TPB variables, but the TPB variables did not explain significant additional 
variance over and above intentions to lie. 
 In addition to these tests of mediation, the indirect effects of the TPB variables 
on applicant faking behaviors were tested using a Sobel (1982) test (McKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Results of these tests are shown in Table 5; 
there was a significant indirect effect of each TPB variable on all three types of faking 
measures. The p-value associated with direct effects indicate that once intentions are 
included in the model as a mediator, none of the TPB variables have a direct effect on 
faking. These results provide further support for Hypothesis 1. 
 
 
Table 5 
Sobel tests of Study 1 indirect effects 
 
Relationship    Indirect effect (SE)  Z-value    Direct effect (p-value)  
SN→INT→IM  -.14 (.04) -3.31** .97 
PBC→INT→IM  -.09 (.04) -2.42*  .17 
ATT→INT→IM  -.18 (.07) -2.69** .62    
 
SN→INT→SR-A  .19 (.05) 3.91**  .84 
PBC→INT→SR-A  .13 (.04) 3.06**  .21 
ATT→INT→SR-A  .27 (.08) 3.56**  .96    
 
SN→INT→DS (T2)  .08 (.03) 2.81**  .79 
PBC→INT→ DS (T2) .06 (.02) 2.32*  .38 
ATT→INT→ DS (T2) .11 (.04) 2.67**  .98 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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 Hypothesis 2 suggested that applicant faking behaviors should lead to an increase 
in observed scores on integrity tests taken as an applicant – that is, applicants who fake 
should get scores that make them look more honest than they actually are. This was 
tested by means of a repeated measures ANOVA, comparing the integrity test scores of 
individuals in the various conditions. If applicant faking leads to increased test scores, 
then participants who are told to fake should receive higher scores than those who are 
told not to fake. 
 The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 6 and 7, which show that 
individuals in the “respond as an applicant” condition received substantially higher 
scores than individuals told to respond honestly. The half-standard deviation difference 
in mean integrity scores between honest and applicant responses is similar to the results 
of studies based on real applicants (e.g., Hough, 1998; Rosse et al., 1998). This provides 
additional support that instructional sets to respond honestly or as an applicant were 
effective. 
 As an additional test of Hypothesis 2, applicant integrity test scores at Time 2 
were correlated with self-reports of attempted faking behaviors. The results were 
significant (r = .16, p < .05); this indicates that the more faking reported by a 
hypothetical “applicant,” the greater their integrity test score. This provides additional 
evidence that faking does affect test scores, lending further support to previous studies 
that faking increases test scores (e.g., Ryan & Sackett, 1987). 
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Table 6 
Time 2 Integrity scores by condition 
 
Source   SS df MS F  η2  
Instruction type 61.9 2 31.0 205.7** .46 
Error   71.7 476 .15 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Pairwise comparison of Time 2 integrity scores (with Bonferonni corrections) 
 
  Mean SD   95%CI        Comparison to Mean difference (d score) 
Honest  3.57 .45 (3.51, 3.64) -   - 
Applicant 3.99 .42 (3.93, 4.04) Honest   .42** (.96) 
Fake  4.28 .59 (4.21, 4.36) Honest   .72** (1.37) 
      Applicant  .30** (.59) 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
 According to Hypothesis 3, the main effect of applicant faking behavior on 
applicant test scores should be moderated by the level of faking ability possessed by the 
individual. As with previous hypotheses, separate models were run for different 
operationalizations of faking behavior, self-report faking and lie scale scores.  The first 
model tested the interaction between applicant self-reports of attempted faking behavior 
and faking ability at Time 2 (Table 8). The model found support for Hypothesis 3. The 
interaction is displayed graphically in Figure 3: for increasing levels of faking ability, 
the effect of self-reported applicant faking behaviors on integrity test scores increases. 
 The same hypothesis was also tested using lie scale scores instead of self-report 
faking behaviors. The interaction was again significant (see Table 9), further supporting  
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Table 8 
Interaction of Time 2 faking ability and applicant faking (SR) on applicant integrity 
scores (T2) 
  
       β B  
Intercept     3.98** 
Faking ability (FA)   -.32 -.21 
Applicant faking (SR)   -.06 -.03 
FA x Applicant faking (SR)   .55* .12* 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Figure 3. Applicant faking (SR) x faking ability5 
 
 
5
 Possible values of the integrity and faking scores ranged from 1 to 5; values for CWB ranged from 0 to 7. 
The range of the X and Y axes in each figure (Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6) were chosen to reflect the range of 
the available data.  
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Table 9 
Interaction of Time 2 faking ability and applicant faking (IM) on Time 2 applicant 
integrity scores 
 
       β B  
Intercept     3.20 
Faking ability (FA)    .41**   .22** 
Applicant faking (IM)    .96**   .65** 
FA x IM    -.81** -.17** 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Figure 4. Applicant faking (IM) x faking ability 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 3. Figure 4 highlights the interaction effect – keeping in mind that lie scale 
scores are such that a lower number represents more dishonest behavior, the figure  
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shows that individuals who are prone to lying and have high levels of faking ability tend 
to get significantly higher scores than individuals who are prone to lying but do not have 
high levels of ability. 
 Hypothesis 4 was tested by correlating individual levels of conscientiousness 
with self-reported attitudes towards faking behaviors. These correlated significantly (r = 
-.29, p < .01). This suggests that more conscientious participants tended to have 
significantly more negative attitudes towards faking behaviors, supporting Hypothesis 4. 
Furthermore, negative correlations between conscientiousness and intention to fake (r = 
-.28, p < .01) and self-report faking (r = -.18, p <.01) were observed. This suggests that 
people who are high on conscientiousness have lower intentions to fake and weaker 
applicant faking attempts. 
 Hypothesis 5 was tested by correlating SAT scores (combined math and verbal) 
with faking ability. SAT scores did predict faking ability at Time 1 (r = .18, p < .01), but 
not at Time 2 (r = .11, p > .05). Thus, there appears to be mixed support for Hypothesis 
5. Furthermore, the correlation between SAT scores and perceived behavioral control 
was not significant (r = .02, p > .05); thus, Hypothesis 6 was not supported. 
 Hypothesis 7 considered the effect that faking behaviors had on applicant 
integrity test validity. This was tested by looking at the effect on CWBs of the 
interaction between applicant integrity scores and applicant faking behaviors. For 
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statistical reasons, CWB scores were transformed into an approximately normal variable 
by taking the logarithm6 (Baba, 1990; Keene, 1995; Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). 
 Support for Hypothesis 7 was somewhat mixed: there was a significant 
interaction between self-reported faking behaviors and applicant test scores (Table 10), 
but no interaction between lie scale scores and applicant test scores (Table 11). The  
 
Table 10 
Interaction between applicant faking (SR) and applicant integrity test (T2) validity for 
CWB 
 
     β  B  
Intercept     3.68** 
Applicant integrity (AI)   -.66** -.62** 
Applicant faking (SR)    -.93 -.44 
AI x Applicant faking (SR)  1.24*  .13* 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
Table 11 
Interaction between applicant faking (IM) and Time 2 applicant integrity test validity for 
CWB 
 
      β  B  
Intercept     2.30** 
Applicant integrity (AI)  -.08 -.07 
Applicant faking (IM)   -.14 -.07 
AI x IM    -.28 -.03 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
6
 Untransformed CWB scores were positively skewed and kurtotic in both Study 1 and 2 (skew = 1.1 and 
1.3; kurtosis = 1.5 and 1.9, respectively); more importantly, the residuals of the standard linear regressions 
based on untransformed CWB scores were not normally distributed and had noticeable levels of 
heteroscedasticity, which could result in biased standard errors. After transformation, residuals were 
homoscedastic and normally distributed. In a recent study of CWBs that also used the Bennett and 
Robinson (2000) scale, Colbert, Mount, Harter, Witt, and Barrick (2004) suggested taking the logarithm of 
the scale. 
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interaction term from Table 10 is shown in Figure 5. The figure shows that high levels of 
faking behavior on the part of applicants reduce the magnitude of the relationship 
between applicant integrity scores and CWBs. 
 The final hypothesis suggested that faking by applicants should alter the rank 
order of integrity test scores. This was tested by use of the Spearman rank-order 
correlation (ρ), which provides a measure of the consistency of rank ordering between 
two variables. Perfect consistency in rank-ordering would be reflected in a perfect rank-
order correlation (ρ = 1). 
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Figure 5. Faking behavior (SR) x applicant integrity test validity 
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 To test the hypothesis, the method of Caruso and Cliff (1997) was used to 
construct 95% CI around ρ; the results indicate that applicant faking behavior altered the 
rank-order of integrity scores compared to honest scores at both Time 1 (rho = .66, 
95%CI =[.62, .69]) and Time 2 (rho = .35, 95%CI = [.30, .40]). The CI did not include 
1.0, indicating significant levels of deviation from perfect rank-order consistency 
between applicant and honest scores at both time periods, supporting this hypothesis. 
 The hypothesis was also tested by comparing changes in top scorers from the 
honest to the applicant condition. In Study 1, of the top 15% of scorers in the honest 
condition, only 39% remained in the top 15% of scorers in the applicant condition. In 
other words, 61% of the people who would have been in the top 15% of scorers under 
honest response conditions were no longer in the top 15% when responding as an 
applicant. This provides further evidence that changes in rank ordering were occurring. 
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STUDY 2 RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
 Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables used in Study 2 
are shown in Table 12. 
Manipulation checks 
 The efficacy of condition instructions was assessed in the same manner as in 
Study 1. A repeated measures ANOVA found significant differences in self-reported 
faking across conditions, F(2,326) = 120.8, p < .01; η2 = .43, with the mean level of self-
reported faking (Table 13) in each condition significantly different from the other 
conditions (p < .01). This suggests that participants understood the instruction sets and 
engaged in different degrees of faking effort across conditions. Furthermore, it can be 
seen that self-reports of faking in the applicant condition are not related to faking in the 
honest condition (r = -.02, p > .05) but are related to faking in the fake-good condition (r 
= .30, p < .01). This lends further support to the idea that the manipulated instructions 
elicited different faking efforts across conditions. 
Relationship between cognitions and intentions 
 Support for the relationship between TPB variables and intentions were 
supported with significant (p < .01) correlations of attitudes toward faking (r = .76), 
subjective norms toward faking (r = .62), and PBC toward faking (r = .66) with intention 
to fake. A regression analysis (Table 14) showed that these three TPB variables 
explained 67% of the variance in the intention to fake. These results are also consistent 
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Table 12 
Study 2 correlation matrix 
 
Variable   N Mean (SD)   1    2    3    4   5   6  7  8   9 10  11  12 13 
(1) SAT  181 1019 (362)   
(2) GMA  180 25.4 (5.4) .25**  
(3) CON  181 3.7 (.60)  .06  .07  .80 
(4) ATT  181 1.7 (.68)  .12 -.02 -.34**  .84 
(5) SN  181 2.0 (.80)  .03 -.13 -.32**  .63**  .73 
(6) PBC  181 2.5 (1.0)  .12 -.02 -.30**  .57**  .47**  .85 
(7) INTENT 181 2.6 (.66)  .08 -.01 -.33**  .76**  .62**  .66**  .85 
(8) HON  152 3.4 (.45) -.18* -.05  .22** -.32** -.25** -.28** -.40**  .93 
(9) APP  152 3.8 (.43) -.04  .16*  .20* -.33** -.29** -.29** -.34**  .47**  .93 
(10) FAKE 152 4.3 (.53)  .02  .36**  .15 -.06 -.05 -.02 -.03  .22**  .37**  .96 
(11) MF  152 .32 (.46)  .15  .20** -.03  .00 -.03  .00  .08 -.54**  .49**  .13  .87 
(12) SR-H  152 2.0 (.68) -.02 -.31**  .02  .15  .15  .13  .23** -.01 -.28** -.26** -.25**  .82 
(13) SR-A  152 2.4 (.85)  .04  .17** -.04  .16*  .10  .16*  .25** -.34**  .19*  .20*  .51** -.02  .87 
(14) SR-F  152 3.6 (1.3)  .14  .26** -.04 -.04 -.09  .05 -.04 -.11  .19*  .34**  .29** -.37**  .30** 
(15) IM  181 3.2 (.75)  .04  .05  .28** -.25** -.24** -.23** -.32**  .46**  .34**  .19* -.13 -.03        -.09 
(16) FA  152 .80 (.62)  .14  .34** -.03  .18*  .13  .19*  .27** -.54** -.03  .70**  .51** -.21**  .42** 
(17) log CWB 154 .79 (.40)  .02  .00 -.23**  .27**  .20**  .28**  .30** -.55** -.32** -.17*  .25**  .01  .13 
 
 
Variable   N Mean (SD)  14   15   16 17 
(14) SR-F  152 3.6 (1.3)  .93 
(15) IM  181 3.2 (.75) -.09  .83 
(16) FA  152 .80 (.62)  .37** -.17*  .93 
(17) log CWB 154 .79 (.40) .14 -.49**  .26** .91 
 
Note: GMA = general mental ability; CON = conscientiousness; ATT = attitudes towards faking; SN = social norms; PBC = perceived behavioral control; HON = honest integrity score; APP 
= applicant integrity score; FAKE = maximal faking integrity score; MF = motivated faking; SR = self-report faking behavior for honest (H), applicant (A), and maximal faking (F) 
conditions; IM = lie scale; FA = faking ability; CWB = counterproductive work behaviors. 
 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 13 
Self-reports of faking across Study 2 conditions 
 
     Mean  SD 1  2  3 4 
1. Intentions    2.63  .66    
2. Self-report - Applicant  2.35  .85  .25** 
3. Self-report - Honest  2.01  .68  .23**  -.02  
4. Self-report - Fake   3.57 1.26     -.04       .30** -.37** 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
Table 14 
Study 2 multiple regression analysis with intention to fake regressed onto attitudes, 
subjective norms, and PBC 
 
Model      β  R  R2     F 
      .82 .67 122.07** 
Attitude toward faking  .47** 
Subjective Norms toward faking .17** 
PBC toward faking   .31** 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
with typical studies on the TPB (Ajzen, 1991), although the multiple correlation between 
TPB cognitions and intentions in the current study (R = .82) were even higher than the 
average multiple correlation (R = .71) from other TPB studies reported by Ajzen (1991). 
Finally, attitudes, social norms and PBC were not nearly as strongly correlated with 
actual faking behaviors (r = .16, p < .05; r = .10, p > .05; r = .16, p < .01). These results 
show that, as expected, the three TPB cognitions are more closely related to general 
intentions to fake in the future than to specific reports of faking on a given test. These 
results also replicate the findings in Study 1. 
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Hypothesis tests 
 Hypothesis 1 was tested using the same method described in Study 1 (Tables 15). 
However, compared to the results of Study 1, the results of the statistical tests of 
Hypothesis 1 were mixed: the mediation hypothesis was not supported using self-report 
attempted faking behaviors, nor using applicant minus honest difference scores, but was 
supported using lie scale scores. 
 In addition to the overall test of mediation, the Sobel tests of indirect effects 
associated with each of the three variables (self-report faking behaviors, difference 
scores, and lie scales) are shown in Table 16. The results indicate that each of the three 
TPB variables had significant indirect effects on faking behavior measured via lie scales 
and self-report, but not on faking measured using difference scores. These results 
provide partial support for Hypothesis 1. 
 A repeated measures ANOVA was used to test Hypothesis 2 (Tables 17 and 18). 
The results indicate that applicant faking behaviors led to increased integrity scores 
compared to honest responding, and that the magnitude of the increases was similar to 
past studies of actual applicants (Hough, 1998; Rosse et al., 1998). This provides further 
evidence of the effectiveness of the instructional manipulations. Furthermore, applicant 
integrity scores and self-reported faking behaviors correlated significantly at r = .19 (p  < 
.05). These results support Hypothesis 2. 
 Tables 19 and 20 present the tests of the interaction between faking ability and 
applicant faking behavior. The interaction was not significant in either case – thus, 
Hypothesis 3 was not supported in this sample. 
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Table 15 
Study 2 hierarchical tests of mediation for different measures of faking 
 
 
 SN PBC ATT INT  R2 Adjusted R2  F df ∆R2 F(∆R2)  
DS     (model step 1) -.05  .01  .03    --  .00 .00 .08 3 .00    .08 
DS     (model step 2) -.11 -.08 -.08  .26  .02 .00 .86 4 .02  3.19 
DS     (model step 3)    --    --    --  .08  .01 .00 .89 1 .01    .89 
DS     (model step 4) -.11 -.08 -.08  .26  .02 .00 .86 4 .02    .85 
SR-A (model step 1) -.02  .10  .12    --  .03 .02 1.78 3 .03   1.78 
SR-A (model step 2) -.09 -.01 -.03  .35*  .07 .05 2.85 4 .04   5.89* 
SR-A (model step 3)    --    --    --  .25**  .06 .06 10.44 1 .06 10.44** 
SR-A (model step 4) -.09 -.01 -.03  .35*  .07 .05 2.85 4 .01     .37 
IM     (model step 1) -.11 -.11 -.12    --  .08 .07 5.45 3 .08   5.45** 
IM     (model step 2) -.06 -.02  .00 -.27*  .11 .09 5.42 4 .02   4.97** 
IM     (model step 3)    --    --   -- -.32**  .10 .10 21.4 1 .10 21.4** 
IM     (model step 4) -.06 -.02  .00 -.27*  .11 .09 5.42 4 .02    .19 
Note: DS = difference scores; SR-A = self-report applicant faking; IM = lie scale score (lower scores indicate greater lying). 
 
   * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 16 
Sobel tests of Study 2 indirect effects 
 
Relationship    Indirect effect (SE)  Z-value    Direct effect (p-value)  
SN→INT→IM  -.17 (.06) -2.70** .45 
PBC→INT→IM  -.15 (.06) -2.72** .68 
ATT→INT→IM  -.22 (.10) -2.27*  .55    
 
SN→INT→SR-A  .22 (.07) 2.99**  .31 
PBC→INT→SR-A  .16 (.06) 2.42*  .82 
ATT→INT→SR-A  .28 (.11) 2.46*  .58    
 
SN→INT→DS  .06 (.04) 1.51  .21 
PBC→INT→ DS  .04 (.04) 1.26  .40 
ATT→INT→ DS  .09 (.06) 1.41  .29 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
Table 17 
Integrity scores by condition 
 
Source   SS df MS F  η2  
Instruction type 53.68 2 26.84 179.24** .52 
Error   48.82 326 .15  
 
 
 
Table 18 
Pairwise comparison of integrity scores (with Bonferonni corrections) 
 
  Mean SD   95%CI     Comparison to    Mean difference (d score) 
Honest  3.45 .45 (3.38, 3.52) -  - 
Applicant 3.77 .43 (3.70, 3.83) Honest  .32** (.73) 
Fake  4.25 .53 (4.17, 4.33) Honest  .80** (1.63) 
      Applicant .48** (.99) 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Table 19 
Interaction of faking ability and applicant faking (SR) 
 
       β B  
Intercept     3.63 
Faking ability (FA)   -.26 -.18 
Applicant faking (SR)    .16  .08 
FA x applicant faking (SR)   .19  .04 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
Table 20 
Interaction of faking ability and applicant faking (IM) 
 
       β B  
Intercept     3.00 
Faking ability (FA)    .24  .17 
Impression management (IM)   .42**  .24** 
FA x IM    -.21 -.05 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 4 was again supported, with conscientiousness correlating r = -.34 (p 
< .01) with attitudes towards faking. Furthermore, the correlation between 
conscientiousness and intention is -.33 (p < .01) and with self-report faking is -.04, (p > 
.05). This suggests that people who are high on conscientiousness have lower intentions 
and fewer actual faking attempts. Hypothesis 5 was partially supported: GMA scores 
correlated r = .34 (p < .01) with faking ability scores, but combined SAT scores did not 
(r = .14, p > .05). However, Hypothesis 6 was not supported; there was no correlation 
between perceived behavioral control of faking and either Wonderlic (r = -.02, p = .78) 
or SAT scores (r = .12, p = .11). 
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 Tests of Hypothesis 7 indicate partial support for the proposed relationship. 
Specifically, CWB scores were predicted by the interaction between applicant integrity 
scores and self-report faking behaviors (Table 21), but not by the interaction between 
integrity scores and lie scale scores (Table 22). The interaction is visualized in Figure 6, 
which shows that individuals who reported greater levels of self-report faking behavior 
had a weaker relationship between applicant integrity scores and CWB scores. 
 
 
Table 21 
Interaction between applicant faking behavior (SR) and applicant integrity test validity 
for CWB 
 
       β  B  
Intercept     4.27** 
Applicant Integrity (AI)  -.84** -.79** 
Applicant faking (SR)   -1.18* -.57* 
AI x SR     1.54* 0.17* 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
 
 
 
Table 22 
Interaction between impression management and applicant integrity test validity for 
CWB 
 
       β  B  
Intercept     3.60** 
Applicant integrity (AI)  -.48 -.35 
Applicant faking (IM)   -1.15 -.54 
AI x IM      .87  .08 
  * p < .05 
** p < .01 
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Figure 6. Effect of applicant integrity x self-report faking behaviors on log CWB scores 
 
 Finally, results from Study 2 support the last hypothesis. Spearman rank-order 
correlations between integrity scores from the applicant and honest conditions were r = 
.48 (p < .01), with a 95% confidence interval of [.35, .60]. Since this did not contain 1.0, 
the test indicated that there are significant differences in the consistency of the rank 
ordering of scores in the two conditions. As with Study 1, the change in rank ordering 
was also examined by identifying changes in the top scorers in the honest and applicant 
conditions. Of the top 15% of scorers in the honest condition, only 32% remained in the 
top 15% of scorers under applicant conditions. 
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DISCUSSION 
 The results of the two studies are summarized in Figure 7. The analysis provided 
initial support for the idea reflected in Hypothesis 1: that applicant faking may result – at 
least partly – from conscious intentions and decisions to fake, which is at least partly 
influenced by applicant cognitions regarding the appropriateness and utility of faking. 
However, these effects appeared to differ somewhat depending on the precise way in 
which faking behaviors were measured. 
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Figure 7. Graphical summary of results (Grey arrows indicate partial support. Black 
arrows indicate full support. Dashed arrows indicate negative relationships.) 
 
 
 Across both studies, tests for mediation based on changes in R2 found initial 
evidence that intentions mediated the effect of the TPB variables on lie scale scores. 
72 
 
However, Study 1 also found some support for mediation associated with applicant-
honest difference scores and self-report faking behaviors, relationships which were not 
supported in Study 2. These results were further confirmed by Sobel tests of the indirect 
effect associated with the TPB cognitions. 
 The second hypothesis was supported in both studies. This result indicates that 
applicant faking behaviors significantly increase applicant integrity scores, based on 
differences in integrity scores observed across response instruction categories, as well as 
differences within the applicant condition, based on self-reported faking behaviors.  
 The third hypothesis was supported in Study 1, but not Study 2. Specifically, 
Study 1 found a significant effect on applicant integrity test scores associated with the 
interaction between individual faking ability and faking behavior (measured using both 
self-reported faking behaviors and lie scale scores). This interaction was in the direction 
predicted, such that individuals who reported high levels of attempted faking (or who 
scored poorly on the lie scale) received higher integrity test scores when they also had 
high ability, compared to people with low ability to fake. However, no significant 
interactions were found in Study 2. 
 Hypothesis 4 was supported in both samples. Across both Study 1 and Study 2, 
conscientiousness was a significant predictor of attitudes towards faking. Specifically, 
individuals higher in conscientiousness tended to have significantly more negative 
attitudes towards faking, and reported lower intentions to fake and applicant faking 
attempts. 
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 Hypothesis 5 was partially supported in both studies, based on SAT scores, but 
clearly supported in Study 2 on the basis of GMA scores. Because SAT scores are only 
an indirect measure of cognitive ability, the measure based on the Wonderlic arguably 
provides the clearer test of Hypothesis 5, and would suggest that Hypothesis 5 was 
supported. 
 Hypothesis 6 was not supported in either study. Results indicate that neither SAT 
scores nor GMA scores were a significant predictor of an individual’s level of perceived 
behavioral control over faking. Thus, general mental ability did not appear to play any 
role in the extent to which individuals perceived themselves to be able to control faking 
behaviors. 
 Hypothesis 7 was partially supported in both studies. In both studies, applicant 
integrity score predictive validity with regards to CWBs were moderated by self-
reported faking behaviors, but not by lie scale scores. This effect was in the direction 
initially hypothesized: individuals who reported more faking behaviors had a weaker 
relationship between applicant integrity test scores and CWBs than those who reported 
fewer faking behaviors. 
 Finally, the last hypothesis was supported in both samples. Results from both 
Study 1 and Study 2 found that applicant-condition and honest-condition integrity test 
scores displayed significant deviations from perfect consistency in rank-ordering – in 
other words, when individuals were asked to fake as applicants, it altered the rank order 
of integrity scores. 
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 Overall, the study suggests that overt integrity test faking is at least partly driven 
by conscious, intentional processes, as well as by individual differences in cognitive 
ability and conscientiousness. Second, faking has substantial effects on both mean levels 
of integrity scores, relative levels of integrity scores (i.e., rank order), as well as on 
integrity test validity. Third, the effects of faking behaviors tend to be moderated by 
individual faking ability. Finally, cognitive ability does not appear to affect perceived 
behavioral control over faking. 
 Previous research (e.g., McFarland, 2000) has attempted to test a model of faking 
based on the Theory of Planned Behavior with mixed results, but the current study finds 
generally stronger evidence for the relationship between TPB cognitions, intentions, and 
actual faking behavior. Compared to the study of personality tests by McFarland (2000), 
the current study finds roughly equivalent predictive power of the TPB variables for 
faking intentions (R2 = .57). However, the current study finds generally more robust 
relationships between intentions to fake and faking behavior than those found in 
McFarland (2000). This suggests that the TPB can be a useful framework for predicting 
applicant faking behavior on overt integrity tests. 
 The current study found that faking intentions had a mean correlation of .17 
(sample-weighted) with applicant-honest difference scores, compared to an average 
correlation of r = .10 between difference scores found by McFarland (2000). In addition, 
intention-behavior correlations for overt integrity difference scores a week later were as 
high as .24 in the current study, compared to those found by McFarland for 
conscientiousness (r = .20, p < .05). 
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 The variance between correlations found by McFarland and the current study 
supports the idea that an intentional, decision-based faking model may not be equally 
predictive across different non-cognitive selection measures. Specifically, the variance in 
intention-behavior relations suggests the possibility of important test-characteristic 
moderators such as test fakability or the social stigma associated with poor test 
performance. The existence of such moderators might determine the extent to which an 
intentional model of faking like the TPB is appropriate for a given test. 
 In the case of overt integrity tests, a TPB-based model may be more appropriate 
than for other non-cognitive selection tests such as personality measures. Overt integrity 
tests have easily-identified positive and negative directions; items which are specific, 
clear, and direct; and a potentially large stigma attached to poor test performance. The 
latter factor may be especially important for determining the relative appropriateness of 
decision-based faking models for selection tests. For instance, a low score on an overt 
integrity test would be associated with the ego-threatening stigma of “thief” or “liar.” In 
contrast, even low scores on very similar scales such as conscientiousness could be 
associated with very different stigmas, such as being perceived as lazy or disorganized.  
 In addition to evidence on the cognitive process of applicant faking, the current 
study also provides additional information on some of the individual differences that 
may play a role in how faking behaviors form and play out in applicant settings. Results 
support the idea that general levels of individual conscientiousness may be an antecedent 
of attitudes towards faking, and intelligence may play a role in the extent to which 
individuals are able to maximize their scores on integrity tests (i.e., faking ability). 
76 
 
Several authors (e.g., Tett et al., 2006) have recently called for models of faking that 
integrate individual differences, and the significant relations found in the current study 
provide empirical evidence of the potential utility offered by such an approach. 
 The evidence that skill or ability plays a role in determining faking outcomes is 
not new, and has been discussed under such terms as “testwiseness” (Edwards, 2003) 
and smart fakers or “test smarts” (Haas, Smith, & McDaniel, 1999; Ones et al., 1996). 
These constructs have often been operationalized using specific aspects of test 
knowledge, item identification accuracy, or the use of particular test-taking strategies. 
Our study finds that cognitive ability predicts faking behavior, but that ability to fake is 
not sufficient for response distortion to occur on integrity tests; having the ability to fake 
does not imply that an applicant will do so. 
 Another interesting finding of the current study is the way in which various 
operationalizations of faking behavior produced slightly different results. The difference 
between measures of generalized (i.e., not specific to a particular situation) faking 
behavior represented by lie scales and situation-specific measures of faking behavior 
(difference scores and self-reported behaviors) appears to be an important factor, 
especially for the relationship described by Hypothesis 7 regarding the effect of faking 
behaviors on integrity test validity. 
 In this case, situation-specific measures of faking were significant moderators of 
the integrity-CWB validity relationship, but a generalized, trait-like measure of 
intentional faking (i.e., lie scale) was not. This result supports findings reported by 
Griffith et al. (2006) that neither impression management (like the scale used in the 
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current study) nor social desirability (another trait-like measure representing 
unconscious faking) do a particularly good job of predicting difference scores occurring 
in specific testing situations. To some extent, this further calls into question the results of 
research into the effects of faking on test validity based on generalized measures of 
response distortion (Ones et al., 1996), and points to the potential importance of specific 
situational factors in determining the exact effects of faking on the selection process. 
 Another issue that our results suggest may be important is the issue of sample 
characteristics. An analysis of sample characteristics from the two studies showed that 
they differed in a number of sample characteristics, including sex (χ2(1) = 8.3, p < .01), 
school classification (χ2(1) = 52.2, p < .01), hours worked per week (χ2(1) = 27.9, p < 
.01), and whether or not they responded to the test with a particular type of job in mind 
(χ2(1) = 35.6, p < .01). Specifically, Study 1 appeared to have a greater proportion of 
females, a broader representation of different student classifications (freshmen, 
sophomores, etc.), more students who worked for more than 10 hours per week, and 
more students who had a specific job in mind when responding. The samples did not 
appear to differ in terms of ethnicity (χ2(1) = 4.1, p > .05) or GPA (χ2(1) = 4.0, p > .05). 
Thus, the different results observed in the two studies may be partly the result of 
differences in sample characteristics, with stronger findings in the sample that reported 
greater job experience and specific job applicant roles used to guide responding. The 
lack of clear applicant schemas and job experience on the part of applicants in Study 2 
may have affected the results. 
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 One of the major questions in faking research is the conditions under which 
faking results in non-optimal selection decisions. Simulation-based studies of selection 
decisions (Schmitt & Oswald, 2006) have suggested that changes in rank ordering may 
reduce the efficiency and fairness of selection decisions, and the present study finds that 
in the case of integrity tests, shifts in rank ordering associated with applicant faking 
behavior occur. 
 Other authors (Tett et al., 2006) have argued that faking may not be a serious 
problem to the extent that other criterion-related variables are also related to faking; for 
example, an individual who fakes on an integrity test has a lower ‘true score’ on the 
construct than their observed test results would indicate. In some cases, this lower ‘true 
score’ may be compensated by other variables related to faking. For example, 
intelligence is related to job performance, and this study finds that it is also related to 
faking ability. If the integrity test was being used to predict job performance, then higher 
cognitive ability would produce greater levels of faking, but also increased levels of job 
performance, thus tending to reduce any adverse effect of faking behavior on integrity 
test validity. 
 This study identified two major individual differences that were indirectly or 
directly related to faking behaviors: conscientiousness and cognitive ability. 
Conscientiousness was a significant negative predictor of CWBs, but had null or 
negative relationships with specific faking behaviors. Intelligence was positively related 
to at least one aspect of faking (faking ability), but not related to the criterion (CWBs). 
Thus, the current study indicates that high levels of conscientiousness and cognitive 
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ability (two important variables in a selection context) may have different effects on the 
relationship between faking and criterion-related validity, at least in the specific case of 
integrity tests and CWBs. 
Implications 
 Overall, these results have a number of implications for research on integrity test 
faking. First, it strongly reinforces recent psychometric-based studies on the significance 
of faking for test validity and outcomes. This is in direct contrast to suggestions by some 
authors (see Morgeson et al., 2007; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998a; Ones et al., 1996) that 
the effects of faking are minimal and pose no threat to test validity. The study clearly 
indicates that intentions to fake are a significant predictor of individual faking behavior, 
and that this behavior affects applicant test scores, rank on the test, and the predictive 
validity of the test with regards to self-reported counter-productive work behaviors. 
Therefore, instead of calling for a moratorium on faking research as some authors have 
done (e.g., Morgeson et al., 2007), this study suggests that a better understanding of 
applicant faking behavior can help ensure the validity and efficiency of integrity tests 
currently in use by organizations. More specifically, the current model provides general 
support for the important role of conscious, intentional processes on the part of 
applicants. 
 Second, the current study provides initial support for the distinction between the 
typical applicant faking behavior (i.e., “will do” faking) and applicant faking ability (i.e., 
“can do” faking) on overt integrity tests. Such a distinction is not just of theoretical 
interest, because it suggests the possibility of an important moderator of faking 
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behaviors (i.e., faking ability), which has not yet been fully integrated into the applicant 
faking literature. The majority of this literature has concerned itself with the causes and 
consequences of faking behaviors, not the separate causes or consequences of faking 
ability (or quality of faking). However, instead of focusing purely on whether people 
faked, researchers may need to pay more attention to how well applicants fake. 
Applicants do not fake uniformly, there are clear alterations to applicant rank-ordering 
based on test scores, and there is some initial support for the relationship between 
cognitive ability and faking ability. 
 This raises the specter of an interesting dilemma for organizations: applicants 
with high cognitive ability and strong motivations to get the job may be the most likely 
to successfully fake. However, these are the applicants most wanted by organizations. 
The current model suggests that hiring based on cognitive ability could lead to an 
increase in the average level of applicant faking. This could shed light on the findings 
that fakers are disproportionately ranked among the top of the applicant pool (e.g., 
Douglas et al., 1996; Rosse et al., 1998). Computer simulated studies that varied the 
number of fakers and amount of faking also found that fakers rise to the top of the rank-
order (Zickar et al., 1996, 2000). Since faking ability increases the effect of applicant 
faking, this could reduce the usefulness of a measure of integrity, especially given the 
use of top-down selection. Organizations interested in both cognitive ability and 
integrity should therefore consider the consequences of their selection system carefully, 
and base their decision on a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the effect of 
faking ability on the predictive validity of integrity tests. 
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 The relationship between cognitive ability and faking ability also suggests one 
potential explanation for the slightly inconsistent (and sometimes null) results on the 
effects of faking on predictive validity, especially for job performance. Individuals with 
high cognitive ability will tend to receive higher test scores when they fake. Normally, 
this might result in a decrease in predictive validity for outcomes like job performance; 
however, the effects of any increase in faking associated with increasing ability could be 
hidden by the substantial relationship between cognitive ability and performance. This is 
consistent with one of the possible explanations by Tett et al. (2006) for why faking may 
not always result in a reduction in predictive validity. 
 Third, the study provides increased support for the role of conscious intentions in 
integrity test faking behavior. Applicant test-taking behaviors may well be affected by 
unconscious biases such as self-deception, but individuals who report a greater intention 
to fake also tend to report greater levels of faking behavior. Previous research has found 
partial support for the role of intentions on faking behavior for personality tests (e.g., 
McFarland & Ryan, 2006), but the current study suggests that overt integrity tests, with 
their clear-purpose nature, could be affected even more strongly by conscious faking 
decisions than are other non-cognitive measures. 
 The significant role played by conscious decision-making processes on overt 
integrity tests suggests directions for research on interventions designed to reduce 
faking. For example, warnings are occasionally used to reduce faking (Dwight & 
Donovan, 2003; Hurtz & Bohon, 1997), and have shown some promise. The current 
research suggests that other interventions designed to increase awareness about the 
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negative consequences of faking, produce social pressure to avoid faking, or prime anti-
faking attitudes could prove especially efficacious, since they would directly influence 
applicant intentions to fake. Organizations interested in reducing or avoiding faking on 
the part of applicants could adopt policies directed towards removing situational or 
cognitive determinants associated with applicant faking cognitions. 
Limitations and future directions 
 While the current study found a number of interesting results, it also had a 
number of limitations that need to be addressed in future research. Although participant 
responses indicated that most students took the test seriously and tried to follow 
instructions, one potential limitation is the reliance on a student (non-applicant) sample. 
Concerns regarding the use of student participants should be limited because the jobs 
held by college students (e.g., finance and sales) make them a fair representation of a 
large group of test takers who have had prior experiences with integrity tests (Ryan & 
Sackett, 1987; Sackett et al., 1989). 
 Another way in which the results of the current study are limited is that the 
proposed model and hypothesis tests do not provide an explicit test of the moderators 
which may influence the appropriateness of a TPB-based model of faking for different 
types of non-cognitive selection tests. Results of the current study and McFarland (2000) 
suggest some potential moderators of the faking intention-faking behavior relation, but 
ultimately inconclusive. The identification of specific test characteristics such as item 
type (i.e., attitudinal versus admittance items), test type (e.g., overt versus covert), or test 
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publisher – that might moderate the relationship between intention and faking behavior – 
could provide a basis for future work on faking interventions. 
 A third limitation is the way in which integrity was measured. Recent reviews 
(Berry et al., 2007) have suggested that integrity is actually a multifaceted, 
multidimensional construct. Research on recently developed multidimensional integrity 
scales suggests that different facets may be faked to different extents (Slaughter, Payne, 
& Yu, 2006). However, the integrity test used in the current study (while widely used 
and well-validated) does not allow for easy testing of facet-specific hypotheses. 
However, the use of such a scale would potentially provide information on the extent to 
which specific integrity test item categories are faked, how item content might moderate 
the effect of faking intentions on test outcomes, or how the various combinations of item 
types on commercial tests can be used to help organizations predict which tests will be 
more or less susceptible to intention-based faking. 
 Beyond addressing specific limitations of the current study, results suggest a 
number of future directions for research on faking and integrity tests. One such 
extension would be to identify other correlates (e.g., ethicality or psychopathy) of the 
TPB variables relevant to organizations. The current model focuses on trying to explain 
the source and effects of faking behavior on integrity tests, but variables like social 
norms towards faking, perceived behavioral control over faking, and attitudes towards 
faking may be useful predictors of other individual behaviors. For example, in the 
current study, faking-related TPB cognitions predicted almost as much variance in 
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CWBs as conscientiousness and applicant integrity scores, two variables that are often 
used to predict CWBs. 
 Related specifically to process models of integrity test faking, the current model 
could be expanded by identifying variables that affect the cognitive accessibility and 
direction of applicant faking cognitions. For example, individuals may participate in 
different types of social networks (work, friendship, etc.) which may or may not overlap. 
Each network represents a possibly different social setting; thus, cognitions of social 
norms accessed by an applicant may be partly dependent on which social setting or 
network is driving an applicant’s perceptions. Social norms of applicant faking that 
might be acceptable in one setting (with strangers) might not be acceptable in another 
(with friends). 
 Cognitions may also be affected by various facets of the organization’s selection 
process. The use of other selection tests that are not as easily subject to faking or 
cheating (e.g., cognitive ability tests or reference checks) may reduce the anticipated 
gains of faking perceived by applicants. The use of computer adaptive testing procedures 
to select items and administer tests may reduce an applicant’s level of perceived control 
over faking (Richman, Kiesler, Weisband, & Drasgow, 1999). Framing applicant 
instructions regarding honesty and faking could affect attitudes towards faking. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Applicant response distortion is a process that is not fully understood, but it is 
clear that intentional faking plays an important role. The present study provides 
information on the cognitions that influence the level of faking applicants display on 
overt integrity tests, and some of the individual differences that influence these factors. 
The results indicate that applicant faking behaviors are directly related to faking 
intentions and indirectly related to other antecedent cognitions. It provides empirical 
evidence for the utility of differentiating between baseline levels of applicant faking and 
individual differences in faking ability, demonstrating that faking ability can stem from 
general cognitive ability. Additionally, it provides evidence for the negative effect of 
faking on the criterion-related validity of overt integrity tests, and for changes in the 
rank-order of applicants associated with faking. 
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APPENDIX A: INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Introduction: 
Howdy! My name is Janie Yu. I will be your experimenter today.  
The purpose of this study is to see how individuals respond to a selection test that is 
commonly used to choose applicants into a variety of jobs. This study requires you to 
take the same test 3 times. Before you take the selection test, you will be asked to fill out 
a survey that will ask you for some questions related to the selection test.  
The consent form I am handing out states the purpose of the study. It also states 
that your responses will remain confidential, your participation is voluntary, and you 
may omit any items and leave at any point of the study. [Pass out and sign consent form 
and answer questions.] I will now hand out the survey packets then read the instructions. 
 
Respond as an Applicant 
The test you are about to take is one that is frequently used by employers to select 
employers for various job types (e.g., sales, managerial positions, finance, etc.). When 
responding to the questions on this test, TRY TO PICTURE YOURSELF AS THE JOB 
APPLICANT. Try to answer the questions as if you were the person who is trying to get 
a job. Please keep in mind that your answers will be kept completely anonymous. To 
make the situation more like a job applicant situation, you will be given an incentive of 
$20 if you score among the top 15% on this test.  
[Source: See McFarland (2000)] 
 
Respond Honestly 
Please answer the following questions on this test as honestly as possible. Please note 
that your answers will remain completely anonymous (i.e., no one, not even the 
researcher will be able to link your answers to your name). Keep in mind that the score 
you obtain on this test will not be used outside the context of this experiment.  That is, 
your answers will be used for researcher purposes only, and will not be used to evaluate 
you in any way, so please ANSWER AS TRUTHFULLY AS POSSIBLE. 
[Source: See McFarland (2000)] 
 
 
Fake good to “beat the test” 
When responding to the questions on this test, select responses that you feel would help 
you OBTAIN THE BEST POSSIBLE SCORE, regardless of how much you have to lie. 
Select answers that you believe will ensure that you will get the highest score possible. If 
you score among the top 15% on this test, you will receive $20.  
[Source: See Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp, & McCloy, 1990; Ryan & Sackett, 1987] 
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APPENDIX B: MEASURES 
 
Previously published measures used in the study are described below, along with 
information on the instructions and response anchors used. Copies of full measures 
may be obtained directly from the source provided. In addition, original measures 
used in the study are reproduced entirely. 
 
 
Conscientiousness Measure (Goldberg, 1999) 
Conscientiousness was assessed using a 10-item scale from Goldberg (1999). 
Respondents are asked to describe how accurately each statement describes them. 
Response anchor ranged from 1 (very inaccurate) to 5 (very accurate).  
 
BIDR-IM subscale version 6 (Paulhus, 1991) 
The Impression Management subscale of the BIDR measure consists of 12 items. A 5-
point response anchor ranging from 1 (not true) to very true (5) was used.  
 
Interpersonal and Organizational Deviance Scale (Bennett & Robinson, 2000) 
This scale provides a 19-item measure of workplace deviance. Respondents are asked to 
estimate the frequency with which they engage in certain types of behaviors. Response 
anchors include: Never, once a year, twice a year, several times a year, monthly, weekly, 
and daily. 
 
TPB Questionnaire (McFarland, 2000) 
These items asked about respondent’s feelings toward lying on employment tests. 
Attitudes towards faking items assess attitudes toward faking by responding to a  
5-item measure based on five different semantic differential-type response scales:   
good bad, pleasant-unpleasant, foolish-wise, useful-useless, and unattractive-attractive.  
Social norms for faking were assessed using a 4-item measure on a 5-point scale 
response anchor ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Perceptions of 
behavioral control over faking were measured using 3 items on a 5-point response 
anchor ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. Intentions to fake on future tests 
were measured using ten items on a 5-point scale, ranging from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree. 
 
Self-Report Faking Measure (McFarland, 2000) 
Items for the self-report faking measure were obtained from McFarland (2000), who 
used the items as a manipulation check for an applicant test-taking condition. This scale 
provides a 7-item measure of attempted faking. Respondents are asked to report the 
extent to which they faked on the test they completed. Response anchors ranged from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
 
Employee Reliability Index (Ryan & Sackett, 1987) 
The ERI is a research tool designed to closely mirror existing overt integrity measures. 
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There are 63 items used to measure overall integrity. Respondents are asked to either 
report the extent to which they agree with a statement (on a scale of 1 to 5, strongly 
disagree to strongly agree), or for certain items, to choose a specific value presented in a 
5-option multiple-choice format. 
 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
1.  What is your gender?  [(a)Male,   (b) Female] 
 
2. With which of the following ethnic groups do you most closely identify? 
a) African American (Black) 
b) Asian or Pacific Islander 
c) Caucasian (White, Non-Hispanic) 
d) Latino/Latina 
e) Other 
 
3. What is your class year? 
 a) Freshman 
 b) Sophomore 
 c) Junior 
 d) Senior 
 
4. On average, approximately how many hours per week have you worked for pay 
during the last year? 
 a) Less than 10 hours per week  
 b) 11 to 19 hours per week  
 c) 20 to 95 hours per week  
 d) 30 to 40 hours per week  
 e) More than 40 hours per week  
 
5. When responding to items on the employment selection test, I had a particular job in 
mind.  [(a) Yes,     (b) No] 
 
6. When responding to items on the employment selection test, I had in mind a job that is    
similar to:   
a) Retail or sales 
 b) Food industry 
 c) Banking industry 
 d) Administrative position 
 e) None of the above 
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7. I was completely truthful when I was instructed to respond honestly:   
a) Strongly agree 
 b) Agree 
 c) Neither agree nor disagree 
 d) Disagree  
 e) Strongly disagree 
 
8. I believe that these types of test should be used to select job applicants.  
 [(a) True,    (b) False] 
 
9. The $20 cash prize was an adequate amount to motivate me. 
 [(a) True,     (b) False] 
 
10. The extra credit was an adequate amount to motivate me.  
 [(a) True,     (b) False] 
 
11. I have completed test(s) that are similar to the employment selection test in this  
study.   
       [(a) Yes,     (b) No] 
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APPENDIX C: ORDER OF ADMINISTRATIONS FOR STUDY 1 AND STUDY 2 
 
Table C1: Order of measurements 
 
 
Measures Administered 
 Study 1 Study 2 
Time 1 SAT 
TPB predictors (SN, PBC, ATT) 
Intention to fake 
Conscientiousness 
Impression Management 
Integrity-Applicant 
Integrity-Honest 
Integrity-Fake  
Demographics 
SAT 
TPB predictors (SN, PBC, ATT) 
Intention to fake 
Conscientiousness 
Impression Management 
Wonderlic Personnel Test 
 
 
Demographics 
Time 2 
(about 1 
week later) 
Integrity-Applicant 
Self-Report Faking  
Integrity-Honest 
Self-Report Faking  
Integrity-Fake 
Self-Report Faking  
Impression Management 
CWB 
Integrity-Applicant 
Self-Report Faking  
Integrity-Honest 
Self-Report Faking  
Integrity-Fake 
Self-Report Faking  
Impression Management 
CWB 
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